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There is nothing to prevent.., invasion of the jury's province except
the self-restraint of the judges themselves. It is simply an institu-
tional risk. Where impulses are so strong to do ultimate justice, and
where the jury and what its members heard, observed and consid-
ered are so far removed from the chambers of the court, the brakes
of self-restraint are severely taxed. The supreme power in a court
system as in any other hierarchy inevitably increases with its
exercise.1
[S]omehow everything in life conspires against courage.2
I. INTRODUCTION
HE purposes of this paper are to evaluate the standard and scope
of appellate evidentiary review of fact findings made by juries and
trial judges under Texas law, and to describe and to criticize the
recent treatment of the duty and causation issues in tort litigation by the
Texas Supreme Court. The court has not acknowledged that the stan-
dards of evidentiary review applied to jury findings have been changed
and one prominent scholar has concluded otherwise,3 but an examination
of the court's recent jurisprudence reveals that significant changes have
been made in the application of the no-evidence standard of review tradi-
tionally applied by Texas courts in assessing the probative value of evi-
dence to support jury findings. During roughly the same ten-year period,
the Texas Supreme Court has otherwise modified the respective roles of
judges, juries, and reviewing courts in Texas by revising its treatment of
the duty and causation issues in tort cases. These companion develop-
ments have shifted the locus of the decision-making process away from
juries and ultimately toward the appellate courts.
Both the methods for deciding the duty and causation issues in civil
litigation and the standards of review applied by reviewing courts to jury
verdicts are of fundamental importance to the operation of the litigation
process because these subjects control the division of adjudicative power
among trial judges, juries, and reviewing courts. This paper explores and
explains these important matters.
II. JUDGES AND JURIES
An accurate, but oversimplified, characterization of the judge-jury rela-
tionship in the litigation process is that trial and appellate judges decide
1. Leon Green, Jury Trial and Proximate Cause, 35 TEXAs L. REV. 357, 358 (1957).
2. Leon Green, Must the Legal Profession Undergo a Spiritual Rebirth?, 16 IND. L.J.
15, 28 (1940).
3. In a provocative article, Dean William Powers, Jr. takes the position that the Texas
Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence has not changed the traditional Texas standard and
scope of no-evidence review, only the court's substantive assessment of duties owed to
injured claimants. Dean Powers' article is discussed below in Part IX of this article. See
William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 1699,
1719 (1997).
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law questions and that juries only decide fact questions. 4 But this is
merely a way to talk about whether the question should be answered by
the court or jury for policy reasons. 5 A more helpful assessment of the
relationship between the trial judge and the jury, on the one hand, and
among the trial judge, the jury, and the appellate courts, on the other
hand, requires more than the simple statement that duty is a question of
law for the court and that breach of duty and causation are questions of
fact6 for the jury to determine under the evidence pursuant to the court's
instructions.
The primary function of the trial judge in jury cases is to declare the
law in the court's charge. 7 The law declaration function is performed by
framing the questions that the jury will be required to answer in order to
decide what happened and, in tort cases, to apply the law to the facts to
4. See Ellis v. Waldrop, 627 S.W.2d 791, 796 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1982), affd in
part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 656 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. 1983).
5. A number of articles have been written about the jury's role in the litigation pro-
cess. See Daniel W. Shuman & Anthony Champagne, Removing the People from the Legal
Process: The Rhetoric and Research on Judicial Selection and Juries, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL'Y, & L. 242 (1997) (explaining how empirical studies among judges, jurors, attorneys,
and experts in Baltimore, Dallas, Seattle, and Tucson demonstrated jurors' ability to fulfill
their courtroom obligations competently and their reactions to the use of expert wit-
nesses); see also Marc Galanter, The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990
U. CH. LEGAL F. 201 (discussing newly focused attacks on juries and proposals to limit
their power); Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated
History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579 (1993) (tracing the practices of opponents to the civil jury
who have used procedural changes to marginalize juries and decrease their power); Rich-
ard L. Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future of Trial Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 725 (1989) (discussing the effects of
other procedural changes on the jury); David Millon, Juries, Judges, and Democracy, 18
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 135 (1993) (reviewing SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVO-
LUTION IN THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (1990)
(describing the nineteenth-century procedural changes used to gradually diminish jury au-
thority)); Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 87 (describing the eighteenth-century changes that altered the relationships of
power among judges, counsel, and jury).
6. For a discussion of this subject see William V. Dorsaneo, III, Broad-Form Submis-
sion of Jury Questions and the Standard of Review, 46 SMU L. REV. 601, 610-14 (1992); see
also Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision Making Authority Between the Trial
and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and
Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993 (1986).
7. Professors Hart and Sacks, in their landmark text, divide the functions of judge
and jury in a threefold manner under which the judge has the job of "law declaration" and
the jury performs the functions of "fact identification" and "law application," unless a spe-
cial verdict system is used to restrict the jury's role to deciding "what happened" in which
case the judge would perform the "law application" function. See HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLI-
CATION OF LAW 352-54 (1994). The normal approach to tort cases in Texas and elsewhere
involves the use of broad-form jury questions under which the jury performs the functions
of "fact identification" and "law application." See Dorsaneo, supra note 6 at 609-26. The
trial judge has other functions, including the determination of the evidence that will be
presented and the rendition of judgment as a matter of law at various stages of the pro-
ceeding. However, rendition of judgment as a matter of law has not been the primary
function of the trial judge in cases tried to juries. See James M. Treece, Leon Green and the
Judicial Process: Government of the People, by the People, and for the People, 56 TEXAS L.
REV. 447, 461-66 (1978). Judgment as a matter of law is only appropriate under the stan-
dards of evidentiary review discussed in Parts IV-VI and VIII of this article.
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decide whether the conduct of the parties violated the applicable stan-
dard of care or conduct and caused harm under the court's instructions,
which define the applicable breach of duty and causation concepts. To
make the questions understandable, the trial judge must give instructions
about the standard of care, the pertinent causation standard, and, if
needed, about compensable injuries and damages. By performing this
function, the trial judge sets out the duty or duties that are pertinent to
the case and prepares the fact finder to decide whether the duties were
breached and caused compensable harm. This is the main meaning of the
phrase "duty is a question of law for the court."
The primary function of the jury as the fact finder is to answer the
question or questions prepared by the trial judge pursuant to the court's
instructions based on the evidence presented at trial through the applica-
tion of the juror's normal reasoning processes during the collective delib-
erative process. In tort litigation, as a general rule the jury is asked to
apply the law to the facts-mixed questions of law and fact-not merely
to decide whether a particular person did or did not engage in specific
conduct. In other words, the jury is asked to set the specific or particular-
ized standard for the case within the general standard supplied by the
controlling legal principle when it decides whether the general standard
was violated in the case sub judice. The jury is also asked whether the
violation caused compensable harm under standards that vary from juris-
diction to jurisdiction and that may vary from one theory of recovery or
defense to another in the same jurisdiction.8 Nonetheless, because these
are the functions that are assigned to juries for policy reasons, 9 questions
of negligence, product defect, and causation are termed "fact questions."
Thus, the main meaning of calling something a fact question is that the
jury is required to answer the question in reaching a verdict, regardless of
whether the verdict form is general or special.
One primary function of a reviewing court is to determine whether the
trial judge properly performed his or her functions during the adjudica-
tive process. Among a great many other matters, not all directly perti-
nent to this article, this includes that the reviewing court may review how
the judge declared the law. In this regard, a reviewing court assesses the
trial judge's performance under a standard of review that involves limited
deference to the manner in which the jury was charged on the law.'10 An-
other primary function of a reviewing court is to assess whether the fact
8. See Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 777-85 (Tex. 1995) (Cornyn, J.
concurring).
9. See Laura Gaston Dooley, Our Juries, Our Selves: The Power, Perception, and
Politics of the Civil Jury, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 325, 328 (1995); see also Treece, supra note 7,
at 455-57.
10. Complaints concerning the court's charge are reviewed under an abuse of discre-
tion standard of review, but the trial judge has no discretion to misstate the law or to deny
submission of a claim or defense raised by the pleadings and the evidence. See Texas Dep't
of Human Servs. v. E. B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990); see also Walker v. Packer, 827
S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992).
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finder's findings are supported by the evidence.11
The point of this simplified description of the respective roles of the
trial judge, the jury, and the appellate courts is to dispel the general view
that somehow what constitutes a question of law or a question of fact can
be divorced from the functions to be performed during the trial and ap-
pellate process. What is really important to decide is how these functions
are performed and how much deference is given to trial judges and juries
by reviewing courts.
III. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF EVIDENTIARY
REVIEW STANDARDS
Although the subject of evidentiary review of jury findings by appellate
courts has received scant attention in academic literature, there is proba-
bly no single legal subject that is more important to the administration of
justice than the standards of judicial review of verdicts, judgments, and
other orders based on the sufficiency of the evidence presented at a hear-
ing or at trial. This subject is important because it imposes principled
constraints on all of the institutional actors who perform the work of de-
ciding cases in the litigation process.
Despite the importance of the approach taken concerning the degree
of deference that should be given to the fact finder, there is no consensus
on the proper approach among the states or within the federal system.
Recently, it has been suggested that the Texas Supreme Court may have
fundamentally altered no-evidence review. 12 Indeed, a critical article ar-
gues that the Texas Supreme Court may prefer its own views about the
outcomes of cases over the views of Texas juries.13 As shown in the fol-
lowing parts of this article, although the basic rules of evidentiary review
have not been abandoned, subtle changes have been made in the applica-
tion of the no-evidence standard of review.
IV. THE TEXAS NO-EVIDENCE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The bases for asserting a legal sufficiency challenge to a verdict or a
particular fact finding as commonly stated by Texas courts are: (i) a com-
plete absence of evidence of a vital fact, i.e., a component element of a
claim or defense; (ii) the court is barred by rules of law, such as the parol
evidence rule or rules of evidence, from giving weight to the only evi-
dence offered to prove a vital fact; (iii) the evidence offered to prove a
vital fact is no more than a scintilla; and (iv) the evidence conclusively
11. See discussion infra Parts IV-VIII.
12. See W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351, 478-79
(1998); see also Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 205-07 (Tex. 1998)
(Gonzalez, J., dissenting).
13. Phillip D. Hardberger, Juries Under Siege, 30 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1 (1998) ("For al-




establishes the opposite of the vital fact. 14
Because most cases do not involve the first two bases for challenging
the evidence in support of a finding on an ultimate fact,' 5 perhaps the
most critical question that must be answered by a reviewing court in con-
ducting a no-evidence review of a fact finding is whether the fact finder
had a reasonable basis to make the finding.16 Moreover, because most
cases do not involve a complete absence of evidence of a vital matter,
another critical question is whether the fact finder could have disregarded
any evidence supporting the proposition or theory that the fact finder
rejected, either because the evidence has no probative value or, more
importantly, because the fact finder found the probative direct and cir-
cumstantial evidence supporting the rejected proposition to be uncon-
vincing.17 These are critical questions because, as long as the fact finder
fulfills its responsibilities, a reviewing court is not permitted to prefer its
own conclusions regarding what happened over the conclusions reached
by the fact finder.18
V. ASSESSING THE SCOPE OF THE TEXAS NO-EVIDENCE
REVIEW STANDARD
The traditional statement of the scope of no-evidence review requires
the trial court and any appellate court that is reviewing the findings in
question to consider only the evidence favoring the finding, disregarding
all direct and circumstantial evidence to the contrary.1 9
14. See Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error,
38 TEXAS L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1960); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d
706, 711 (Tex. 1997).
15. Although the Texas Supreme Court has occasionally used scintilla-rule language in
discussing the probative value of expert testimony, it seems more reasonable to consider
testimony that comes from an unqualified witness or that does not satisfy current standards
of relevance and reliability as evidence that is entitled to no weight under rules of law or
evidence. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711. "More than a scintilla of evidence exists where
the evidence supporting the finding, as a whole, 'rises to a level that would enable reasona-
ble and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions.'" Burroughs Wellcome Co. v.
Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879
S.W.2d 10, 25 (Tex. 1994)).
16. See Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Reyna, 865 S.W.2d 925, 927-28 (Tex. 1993); Kindred v.
Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983).
17. See Rivas v. Garibay, 974 S.W.2d 93, 96 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. de-
nied) ("A jury may disbelieve any witness, including a physician, even though that wit-
ness's testimony is not contradicted."). But see Schwartz v. Pinnacle Communications, 944
S.W.2d 427, 434 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ) ("[w]hile the fact finder is
charged with the duty of deciding issues raised by conflicting evidence, when the evidence
is not conflicting, the fact finder may not disregard uncontradicted testimony in order to
decide an issue in accordance with its own wishes.").
18. See Benoit v. Wilson, 239 S.W.2d 792, 796 (Tex. 1951).
19. See Continental Coffee Prods. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex. 1996); Cart-
wright v. Canode, 171 S.W. 696, 698 (Tex. 1914). To accommodate the traditional ap-
proach, which is designed to review findings by considering the evidence "in its most
favorable light in support of the verdict," if the party with the burden of proof challenges a
negative finding, the record must be examined under a two-step process. First, the record
is examined for evidence that supports the negative finding. "If there is no evidence to
support the fact finder's answer, then secondly, the entire record must be examined to see
[Vol. 531502
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The scope of review is an important prophylactic against the inten-
tional or inadvertent invasion of the jury's province as the fact finder.20
The tendency to weigh the evidence is difficult to resist if the scope of
review is not limited to the favorable evidence, including reasonable in-
ferences favoring the finding or the findings. If the direct evidence and
reasonable inferences 21 that support the verdict must be viewed through
the prism of the entire record of the evidence, including some strong evi-
dence supporting the party who challenges the verdict, the evidence sup-
porting the verdict may be more easily discounted.
The federal courts of appeals have stated differing formulations of the
standard and scope of review for a legal insufficiency challenge, and, until
recently, the Supreme Court appears to have had no interest in resolving
the conflict among the circuits.22 As explained in Justice White's dissent
from the denial of certiorari in Schwimmer v. Sony Corporation of
America, for a number of years the federal courts of appeals followed
three different approaches to determining whether evidence is sufficient
to create a jury issue. As Justice White explains:
[I]t is the Second Circuit's practice to examine all of the evidence in
a manner most favorable to the nonmoving party. This is also the
position of at least the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. In the Eighth Cir-
cuit, however, it appears that only evidence which supports the ver-
dict winner is to be considered. The First and Third Circuits follow a
middle ground: the reviewing court may consider uncontradicted,
unimpeached evidence from disinterested witnesses.23
if the contrary proposition is established as a matter of law." Holley v. Watts, 629 S.W.2d
694, 696 (Tex. 1982)..The Texas Supreme Court has also held that although an affirmative
finding must be based on some probative evidence, a negative finding is "nothing more
than [a finding] ... that the [party with the burden of proof] failed to carry its burden of
proving the fact." C. & R. Transp., Inc. v. Campbell, 406 S.W.2d 191, 194 (Tex. 1966). This
method of reasoning is helpful when the party without the burden of proof wants to em-
brace the verdict because the party with the burden of persuasion has failed to obtain a
finding on a vital element of a claim or a defense. See id.; Grenwelge v. Shamrock Recon-
structors, Inc., 705 S.W.2d 693, 694 (Tex. 1986).
20. See, e.g., Benoit, 239 S.W.2d at 796-97.
21. The reasonableness of inferences that may be drawn from the evidence must be
evaluated in light of all facts and circumstances that the fact finder is required to consider.
See Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Burden, 203 S.W.2d 522, 530 (1947); see also Simmons & Sim-
mons Constr. Co. v. Rea, 286 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1955).
22. See Schwimmer v. Sony Corp. of Am., 459 U.S. 1007, 1009 (1982).
23. Id. (citing Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969)); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 281-82 (7th Cir. 1981); Simpson v. Skelly Oil Co., 371
F.2d 563 (8th Cir. 1967); Layne v. Vinzant, 657 F.2d 468, 472 (1st Cir. 1981); Inventive
Music Ltd. v. Cohen, 617 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir. 1980)). Justice White explains in his dissent
in Schwimmer that because the issue "will often be influential, if not dispositive, of a mo-
tion for judgment n.o.v., this disagreement among the federal courts of appeals is of far
more than academic interest." Schwimmer, 459 U.S. at 1009. Despite the importance of
the subject, a brief review of the academic literature on this subject and the case law makes
it plain that very few commentators have been interested in it. See Steven Alan Childress,
Judicial Review and Diversity Jurisdiction: Solving an Irrepressible Erie Mystery?, 47 SMU
L. REV. 271 (1994); Patrick Higginbotham, Continuing the Dialogue: Civil Juries and the
Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEXAS L. REV. 47 (1977); Eric Schnapper, Judges Against
Juries-Appellate Review of Federal Civil Jury Verdicts, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 237 (1989); see
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The Eighth Circuit has expressed the accurate view that a considera-
tion by a reviewing court of only the evidence that supports the finding
"will result in fewer grants of motions for directed verdict than would
result if judges were free to take cases from the jury because of what they
view as very strong evidence supporting the moving party."' 24 Of course,
this does not mean that the limited review standard is too deferential. It
does, however, recognize that a consideration of only the favorable evi-
dence and reasonable inferences is a more deferential way of viewing the
evidence in its most favorable light in support of the finding than a con-
sideration of both the favorable and the unfavorable evidence and
inferences.
The Fifth Circuit's embrace of whole record review in Boeing Company
v. Shipman25 requires a reviewing court to consider all of the evidence,
"but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the
party" in whose favor the finding was made. 26 The Shipman opinion does
not, however, make it clear how this analytical process works. Beyond
stating that a motion for judgment as a matter of law "should not be
decided by which side has the better [case],... [or] only when there is a
complete absence of probative facts to support a jury verdict ...[and
that] [t]here must be a conflict in substantial evidence to create a jury
question, '27 the court of appeals does not explain how the reasonableness
of an inference is to be evaluated or what constitutes a conflict in substan-
tial evidence. It is, however, possible to read the opinion to mean that
the nonmovant's evidence will be viewed in the context of the movant's
strong evidence and that a trial judge may grant judgment as a matter of
law if very strong evidence supports the movant's position. Justice Rives,
however, in partial dissent in Shipman, not only regards the question of
the sufficiency of the evidence to require submission of a case to a jury as
a constitutional issue. 28 He reasons that the court of appeals' en banc
opinion "downgrades the Seventh Amendment" and "commits an error
of constitutional proportions which will continue to plague this Court and
the district courts of this Circuit until the Supreme Court grants certiorai
in ... some future case."'29
Thirty years after Justice White's dissent in Schwimmer, the Supreme
Court granted certiorai in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,30
an age discrimination case in which the Fifth Circuit reversed a district
court judgment based on a jury's verdict of willful discrimination on the
ground that the verdict was not supported by probative evidence.31 The
also 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2529, at 297-300 (2d ed. 1994).
24. Dace v. ACF Indus., Inc., 722 F.2d 374, 376 (8th Cir. 1983).
25. 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969).
26. Id. at 374.
27. Id. at 375.
28. See id. at 377-78.
29. Id.
30. - U.S. -, 120 S. Ct. 2097 (2000).
31. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 197 F.3d 688, 694 (5th Cir. 1999).
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Supreme Court reversed. The Court specifically held that in an age dis-
crimination case, a prima facie case of discrimination 32 and sufficient evi-
dence for the fact finder to reject the employer's explanation as a pretext
and unworthy of belief, may preclude rendition of judgment against the
claimant as a matter of law, even though no independent and additional
evidence of willful discrimination is introduced. 33 Because the court of
appeals ignored the evidence supporting the petitioner's prima facie case
and the evidence challenging the employer's explanation for its decision
to discharge the petitioner, the Court reversed.
Of much more general significance, the Court addressed in Reeves
and for the most part resolved, the differences between the courts of ap-
peals on the issue of the scope and standard of appellate review of fact
findings. 34 The Court explained that some decisions have stated that re-
view is limited to the evidence favorable to the nonmoving party35 while
most hold that review extends to the entire record.36 But the Court re-
garded this distinction as "more semantic than real" and explained that
while review of all of the evidence is required to determine a motion for
judgment as a matter of law, the trial judge is required to give credence to
the evidence and reasonable inferences which tend to support the finding
and to disregard all contrary evidence that the jury was not required to
believe.37 This means that the reasonableness of inferences involves a
consideration of the evidence as a whole, but not that a reviewing court
may make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.
[T]he court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-
moving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or
weigh the evidence .... Credibility determinations, the weighing of
the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts
are jury functions, not those of a judge." Thus, although the court
should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence
favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe
.... That is, the court should give credence to the evidence favoring
the nonmovant as well as that "evidence supporting the moving
party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent
32. As defined in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), a prima
facie case is established if the claimant shows: (i) that he or she belongs to a racial minor-
ity; (ii) that he or she applied and was qualified for a job; (iii) that despite his or her
qualifications, the claimant was rejected; and (iv) that the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of the claimant's qualifications. See
id. at 802. In an ADEA discharge case, a prima facie case of discrimination is established if
the plaintiff shows that he or she was: (i) discharged; (ii) qualified; (iii) within the protected
class at the time of discharge; and (iv) either replaced by someone outside the class or
someone younger, or otherwise discharged because of age. See Bodenheimer v. PPG In-
dus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993).
33. See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2109.
34. See id. at 2109-10.
35. See Aparicio v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 84 F.3d 803, 807 (6th Cir. 1996); Simp-
son v. Skelly Oil Co., 371 F.2d 563, 566 (8th Cir. 1967).
36. See, e.g., Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969); Tate v. Govern-
ment Employees Ins. Co., 997 F.2d 1433, 1436 (11th Cir. 1993).
37. See Reeves, 120 S. Ct. at 2110.
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that [it] comes from disinterested witnesses. '38
One of Texas' leading legal citizens, Chief Justice Robert W. Calvert, as
part of his career objective to clarify Texas procedural principles, must be
given primary credit for crystallizing the traditional standard and the per-
missible scope of no-evidence review based on his frequently cited law
review article. 39 Some commentators have mistakenly, I think, consid-
ered that an opinion written by Justice Calvert defines the scope of re-
view more broadly to include all of the direct evidence and reasonable
inferences concerning the finding, both favorable and unfavorable.40 But
in that opinion Justice Calvert seems to have adopted the sensible view
that the only way to consider the evidence in the most favorable light
when assessing the validity of the verdict is to determine whether any
direct or circumstantial evidence, including reasonable inferences drawn
from the totality of the circumstantial evidence, supports the fact find-
ings, without regard to the existence of other direct evidence or compet-
ing reasonable inferences that do not do so.4" Although some recent
cases that cite the opinion 42 could be interpreted to embrace a different
standard, they really do not do so and should not be so interpreted. In
fact, the so-called "particularized application of our traditional standard
of review, '43 under which an insurer's basis for denying claims could not
be disregarded, has itself been discarded.44
38. Id. at 2110 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)).
39. See Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error,
38 TEXAS L. REV. 361, 364 (citing Cartwright v. Canode, 171 S.W. 696, 696-97 (1914)).
40. See Harbin v. Seale, 461 S.W.2d 591, 592 (Tex. 1970) ("All evidence must be con-
sidered in a light most favorable to the party in whose favor the verdict has been rendered,
and every reasonable inference deducible from the evidence is to be indulged in such
party's favor."); W. Wendell Hall, Standards of Review in Texas, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351,
478-79 (1998).
41. See Harbin, 461 S.W.2d at 592 ("Thus, the question before this court is whether
there is evidence of probative force in the record which supports the jury's finding of gross
negligence.").
42. See Formosa Plastics Corp. USA v. Presidio Eng'rs and Contractors, Inc., 960
S.W.2d 41, 48 (Tex. 1998); Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex.
1997); see also Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276, 286
(Tex. 1998).
43. Lyons v. Millers Cas. Ins. Co. of Tex., 866 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex. 1993). In Lyons,
the court devised "a particularized application of our traditional no evidence [scope of]
review" under which a review of "the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a bad
faith finding [must] focus ... on the relationship of the evidence arguably supporting the
bad faith finding." Id. In other words, the evidence of the insurer's basis for denial of the
claim cannot be disregarded and, if probative and uncontroverted, can be conclusive.
44. See Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 55 (Tex. 1997); Standard Fire
Ins. Co. v. Stephenson, 955 S.W.2d 665, 668 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1997, no pet.) (with-
drawn from publication).
1506 [Vol. 53
2000] JUDGES, JURIES, AND REVIEWING COURTS
VI. CHANGES IN THE STANDARD OF REVIEW: MODERN
TEXAS CASES DO GIVE REVIEWING COURTS MORE POWER
TO CONCLUDE THAT NO PROBATIVE
EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE VERDICT
Although the scope of review probably has not yet been changed by
the Texas Supreme Court, three significant procedural developments ap-
pear to have changed no-evidence review. First, an unfortunate and mis-
guided rearticulation of the scintilla rule has made it easier for reviewing
courts to disregard favorable inferences that support a verdict.45 Second,
the Texas Supreme Court has embraced and extended the principle that
undisputed evidence cannot be disregarded. 46 Third, the probative value
of expert testimony-its relevance and reliability-has become a ques-
tion for the court, not the fact finder.47 The importance of these develop-
ments cannot be overemphasized because they alter the fundamental
principle that the court is never permitted to substitute its findings and
conclusions for that of the jury.
A. REASONABLE INFERENCES AND THE SCINTILLA RULE
A longstanding rule has treated weak circumstantial evidence that does
no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of the existence of a
vital fact as no evidence. In Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc.,48 the court ex-
plained that:
[t]he test for the application of this no evidence/scintilla rule is that if
reasonable minds cannot differ from the conclusion that the evidence
offered to support the existence of a vital fact lacks probative force,
it will be held to be the legal equivalent of no evidence. However,
there is some evidence, more than a scintilla, if the evidence fur-
nishes some reasonable basis for differing conclusions by reasonable
minds as to the existence of the vital fact.49
The scintilla rule has been recast in a number of cases as a rule that
treats so-called "equal inferences" as improper and nonprobative. 50 The
45. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1998).
46. See, e.g., Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 190 (Tex. 1998).
47. See generally Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 711-12.
48. 650 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. 1983).
49. Id. at 63. The reasonableness of the inferences that the fact finder may draw from
the evidence as a whole must be evaluated in light of all facts and circumstances. See
generally Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Burden, 203 S.W.2d 522, 530 (1947); Seymour v. American
Engine Co. & Grinding, 956 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ de-
nied) ("In our review of the evidence, the reasonableness of an inference that may be
drawn from evidence must be evaluated in light of all facts and circumstances, including
those circumstances in derogation of that inference."); see also Simmons & Simmons Con-
str. Co. v. Rea, 286 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1955).
50. See Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex. 1984);
$56,700 in U.S. Currency v. State, 730 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. 1987). Although this method
of analysis is not entirely unprecedented, as Justice Calvert himself notes there is no need
for it, although he apparently regards it as harmless. See Robert W. Calvert, "No Evi-
dence" and "Insufficient Evidence," 38 TEXAS L. REV. 361, 365 (1960) ("Opinions in some
of the decided cases indicate that an inference contrary to a finding of a vital fact is consid-
ered when the existence of the vital fact is essential to a recovery and the facts proved give
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equal-inference version of the scintilla rule can be used as a blunt instru-
ment to challenge the fact finder's inference whenever the opposing party
has a competing factual theory that is reasonable. 5' This is a clear usur-
pation of the fact finder's traditional role. Unfortunately, a bare majority
of the current court has arguably embraced this methodology. 52
Even before the court's political composition changed, however, this
questionable approach to no-evidence review had been used to set aside a
jury's verdict. In $56,700 in U.S. Currency v. State,53 a civil forfeiture case
involving $56,700 found by the police during the seizure of cocaine at
Harry Farah's condominium, the Texas Supreme Court sustained a no-
evidence point of error directed at the trial judge's finding that Farah
derived the funds from the sale or distribution of illegal drugs. The evi-
dence showed signs of drug use, possible drug sales, and an alternative
explanation for the source of the 567 one hundred dollar bills found on
the premises. Based on Litton Industrial Products, Inc. v. Gammage,54 a
case that involved no basis for drawing reasonable, but conflicting, infer-
ences from the circumstantial evidence, a majority of the Texas Supreme
Court explained that the circumstantial evidence gave rise to two equally
plausible inferences-Farah was a drug user who obtained the funds in a
legitimate manner, or Farah obtained the one hundred dollar bills from
drug sales-nothing showed that one factual theory was more probable
than the other. The majority opinion clearly bases its poorly reasoned
conclusion on a mistaken view of the distinction between a true presump-
tion, which disappears when contrary evidence is produced, and a reason-
able inference, which does not.55
Because any ultimate fact may be proved by circumstantial evidence,56
Justice Campbell dissented and took the majority to task for invading the
province of the fact finder:
rise to opposing inferences which are equally reasonable and plausible. In that situation it
is said that a finding that the vital fact exists is purely speculative and a no evidence point is
sustained. It appears that the opposing inference is considered for the purpose of deter-
mining whether the necessary supporting inference may be drawn with reasonable cer-
tainty. There would appear to be no necessity for the variation. The opposing inference is
present and it does no harm to note its presence, but the basic reason for sustaining the 'no
evidence' point is that the inference supporting the finding of the vital fact is not reasona-
bly to be drawn from the meager facts proved.") Unfortunately, Judge Calvert was mis-
taken in his view that the variation does no harm because it can be used to argue that
opposing reasonable inferences have no probative value, i.e., that only the most convincing
reasonable inference has probative value.
51. See, e.g., Continued Care, Inc. v. Fournet, 979 S.W.2d 419, 421-22 (Tex. App.-
Beaumont 1998, no pet.)
52. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1998).
53. 730 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1987).
54. 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex. 1984).
55. See $56,700 in U.S. Currency, 730 S.W.2d at 662 ("Any presumption which may
have arisen that the currency was derived from the sale or distribution of illicit drugs was
rebutted [by the testimony]."); see also Scott v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. of Tex., 524
S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex. 1975); Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Greenwade, 159 S.W.2d 854, 857
(1942).
56. -See Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 755 (Tex. 1975).
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The majority has misapplied the rules relating to inferences and has
invaded the province of the fact finder. It is well established that
more than one inference may be drawn from a single fact situation.
Although inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence may be re-
butted, this question is determined by the fact finder unless only one
reasonable deduction can be drawn therefrom. The proponent of
such evidence need not disprove all other possible conclusions which
could be drawn from the circumstances.57
Justice Campbell concluded:
[t]he circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court has the
probative force sufficient to constitute a basis for legal inference that
the currency was derived from the sale of cocaine. Therefore, it is
the duty and responsibility of this Court to uphold the findings and
judgment of the trial court and not to substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court.58
Another example of the substitution of the equal-inference version of
the scintilla rule for the more traditional "reasonable minds" approach
appears in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez,59 a case that cites $56,700 in
U.S. Currency v. State approvingly. Gonzalez was a slip and fall case in
which the plaintiff slipped on a pile of macaroni. The circumstantial evi-
dence was that the "macaroni had mayonnaise in it, was 'fresh,' 'wet,'
'still humid,' and contaminated with 'a lot of dirt." 60 The court charac-
terized this evidence as follows:
Dirt in macaroni salad lying on a heavily-traveled aisle is no evidence
of the length of time the macaroni had been on the floor. That evi-
dence can no more support the inference that it accumulated dirt
over a long period of time than it can support the opposite inference
that the macaroni had just been dropped on the floor and was
quickly contaminated by customers and carts traversing the aisle.
The presence of footprints or cart tracks in the macaroni salad
equally supports the inference that the tracks were of recent origin as
it supports the opposite inference, that the tracks had been there a
long time.
We hold that the evidence that the macaroni salad had "a lot of dirt"
and tracks through it ... is no evidence that the macaroni had been
on the floor long enough to charge Wal-Mart with constructive no-
tice of this condition. Gonzalez had to demonstrate that it was more
likely than not that the macaroni salad had been there for a long
time; Gonzalez proved only that the macaroni salad could possibly
57. $56,700 in U.S. Currency, 730 S.W.2d at 663 (citing Walters v. American States Ins.
Co., 654 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tex. 1983); Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 757 (Tex.
1975); Ross v. Green, 139 S.W.2d 565, 572 (1940)).
58. Id.
59. 968 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1998). Although no dissenting opinion has been delivered,
Chief Justice Phillips and Justices Abbott, Hankinson, and Spector noted their dissent from
the majority opinion delivered by Justice Gonzalez and joined by Justices Hecht, Enoch,
Owen and Baker.
60. Id. at 936.
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have been there long enough to make Wal-Mart responsible for no-
ticing it.61
Based on these authorities, among others, it can be argued that the
court has recognized a new scintilla rule under which equally plausible
inferences always negate each other. This can be a clear departure from
the view that it is the jury's role to select "from the conflicting evidence
and conflicting inferences that which it considered most reasonable. '62
Under a no-evidence analysis based on an assessment of circumstantial
evidence, a reviewing court must decide whether reasonable minds could
differ with respect to the matter in controversy. The principle applied by
the majority opinion in the Wal-Mart case concerning "equally plausible
but opposite inferences" is not a necessary part of this reasoning pro-
cess. 63 In fact, it allows for a perversion of the review process in most
cases, which do not involve a paucity of circumstantial evidence. In many
cases involving an ordinary amount of circumstantial evidence, that is, the
facts and circumstances surrounding an event or occurrence from which
inferences may be drawn concerning what happened, whether an applica-
ble standard of care was violated or what caused harm to the claimant,
more than one inference is commonly permissible. 64
Under well-established principles, it is impermissible for a trial judge or
a reviewing court to set aside a jury verdict "because the record contains
evidence of and gives equal support to inconsistent inferences" 65 as long
as the inference drawn by the jury is not based merely on speculation or
conjecture. Thus, a true equal-inference case is one involving "meager
circumstantial evidence" 66 from which no reasonable inference can be
drawn. In Litton Industrial Products,67 for example, the record con-
tained very little information concerning the matter in controversy, i.e.,
whether the product in question was sold after the effective date of the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The evidence showed that ratchet
adaptors of the same type had been sold before the enactment of the Act
as well as thereafter. Under these circumstances, the meager circumstan-
tial evidence did give rise to equal inferences, not because the evidence
pointed in two different directions, but because the circumstantial evi-
dence provided no reasonable basis for inferring that the product in ques-
tion was purchased before, rather than after, the effective date of the Act.
This is an entirely different type of situation from the one that confronted
61. Id. at 937-38.
62. Benoit v. Wilson, 239 S.W.2d 792, 797 (1951).
63. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, 968 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1998).
64. See, e.g., Farley v. M M Cattle Co., 529 S.W.2d 751, 756-57 (Tex. 1975) (involving a
single fact pattern supporting competing reasonable inferences about causation).
65. Benoit, 239 S.W.2d at 797 ("This court should never set aside a jury verdict merely
because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions.").
66. See, e.g., Litton Indus. Prods. Inc. v. Gammage, 668 S.W.2d 319, 324 (Tex. 1984)
(holding evidence that defendant sold same tool before and after effective date of DTPA
did not permit inference that defendant did any act or practice in violation of DTPA).
67. 668 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. 1984).
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the court in $56,700 in U.S. Currency,68 a case in which the conflicting
evidence would support alternative and reasonable inferences about the
source of the disputed funds. Moreover, although the question is a much
closer one in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez, the Court's focus should
have been more directly on whether reasonable minds could conclude
that the macaroni had been on the floor long enough to charge Wal-Mart
with knowledge, not on some type of weighing or balancing test.
Use of the equal-inference approach to the no-evidence review stan-
dard can create analytical problems and, for two reasons, can be used to
invade the province of the jury. First, it assumes that not more than one
reasonable inference can be drawn from the totality of the circumstantial
evidence. Second, it requires that the claimant's suggested inference
must be the most convincing inference among the reasonable inferences
that can be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, thereby miscasting
the standard of evidentiary review. 69 This is a clear departure from the
view that it is the jury's role "[to select] from the conflicting evidence and
conflicting inferences that which it considered most reasonable. '70
The equal-inference articulation of the scintilla rule allows counsel to
argue, and a reviewing court to find, that because each party's factual
claim is reasonably plausible, no probative evidence has been presented.
Similarly, it allows a reviewing court to select from the conflicting infer-
ences, the inference that the court prefers, i.e., considers most reasonable,
thereby supplanting the jury and the jury's choice among conflicting rea-
sonable inferences. 71
B. UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE
Until recently, it was not clear whether undisputed evidence would be
exempted from the traditional evaluation process. Many cases unequivo-
cally state that the jury is the exclusive judge of the facts and the credibil-
ity of the witnesses. Nonetheless, some older cases made the point that
neither the fact finder nor the reviewing court could disregard the uncon-
68. See $56,700 in U.S. Currency v. State, 730 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1987).
69. See, e.g., Lozano v. Lozano, 983 S.W.2d 787, 790 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1998, pet. granted) ("In order to overrule appellants' no-evidence point of error, we must
find that the inference of appellants' knowledge drawn from the circumstantial evidence is
more reasonable than the lack of knowledge inference proposed by appellants.").
70. See Benoit v. Wilson, 239 S.W.2d 792, 797 (Tex. 1951).
71. Another "purported rule," as described by Judge Calvert, is that a no-evidence
point must be sustained if a finding of fact can be supported only by piling inference upon
inference. Chief Justice Robert W. Calvert explains that "[aIctually, that is not a separate
rule of decision; it is also [like the so-called equal-inference rule] but another way of saying
that the vital fact may not reasonably be inferred from the meager facts proved in the
particular case." Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of
Error, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 361, 365 (1962) (citing Phoenix Ref. Co. v. Powell, 251 S.W.2d 892
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n.r.e.)) (quoting Dean Wigmore's scathing
criticism of the inference piling rule). As the Calvert article suggests, Texas courts would
be much better off to abandon the inference piling approach to no-evidence review be-
cause it is hard to apply, easy to manipulate, and simply not a reliable tool for assessing the
reasonableness of an inference.
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tradicted testimony of a disinterested witness. 72 Recently, this same con-
cept has been applied to uncontroverted direct evidence from interested
witnesses. 73 Under current thinking, if the interested witness' testimony
is clear, direct, and positive, free from contradictions, inaccuracies, and
circumstances tending to cast suspicion on the evidence, and if it is cor-
roborated or could have been readily controverted by an opponent, but
was not controverted, 74 it may conclusively establish the matter in contro-
versy. Although the wisdom of giving conclusive effect to the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of an interested witness may be questioned, because of
the limits imposed on this approach, no serious problems in the adminis-
tration of justice are normally presented by this principle of undisputed
evidence.
The biggest and arguably most problematic, if not pernicious, develop-
ment concerns the treatment of so-called "undisputed circumstantial evi-
dence." Circumstantial evidence may be defined as the facts and
circumstances surrounding an event or occurrence from which inferences
may be reasonably drawn concerning what happened, whether the appli-
cable standard of care was violated, what the actors concerned in the
event intended or believed, or what caused harm to a claimant. Under
this analysis, the circumstantial evidence is distinct from the inferences
that may reasonably be drawn from the circumstances. Accordingly,
even in cases in which the circumstantial evidence or some part of it is
undisputed, it is quite possible that the inferences to be drawn from the
evidence are hotly contested and at the center of the controversy that
must be resolved by the fact finder. 75 In other words, merely because
some or all of the circumstantial evidence is undisputed, it will not neces-
sarily or even normally follow that an inference drawn from the evidence
will also qualify as undisputed evidence. Nonetheless, in an important
recent case, the Texas Supreme Court opined in a footnote that reviewing
courts need not "disregard undisputed evidence that allows of only one
logical inference. ' 76 As reflected in the cases relied upon in the foot-
note,77 this means that if the facts are undisputed, and they admit or al-
72. See, e.g., Texas & N.O.R. Co. v. Burden, 203 S.W.2d 522, 530 (1947).
73. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Pinnacle Communications, 944 S.W.2d 427, 431-33 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ).
74. See Collora v. Navarro, 574 S.W.2d 65, 68-70 (Tex. 1978); see also Lofton v. Texas
Brine Corp., 777 S.W.2d 384, 386 (Tex. 1989).
75. An important threshold principle for the analysis of circumstantial evidence recog-
nizes that the reasonableness of inferences that could be drawn from the circumstantial
evidence must be evaluated in light of all facts and circumstances that the fact finder is
required to credit, i.e., undisputed facts and circumstances. See Texas & N.O.R. Co., 203
S.W.2d at 530; Simmons & Simmons Constr. Co. v. Rea, 286 S.W.2d 415, 419 (1955).
76. Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 51 n.1 (Tex. 1997); see also GXG,
Inc. v. Texacal Oil & Gas, 977 S.W.2d 403, 423 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998, pet.
denied).
77. Wininger v. Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. Co., 143 S.W. 1150, 1152 (1912); Texas & N.O.R.
Co. v. Rooks, 293 S.W. 554, 556-57 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, motion for rehearing
overruled).
1512 [Vol. 53
2000] JUDGES, JURIES, AND REVIEWING COURTS
low only one logical inference, circumstantial evidence can establish an
ultimate fact, such as negligence, as a matter of law.
The footnote does not mean that undisputed facts normally give rise to
only one reasonable inference, that the fact finder is required to select the
most reasonable inference 78 or to choose the same inference that a re-
viewing court might have selected. Under a proper analysis, a reviewing
court is not permitted to treat evidence as undisputed merely because it is
not directly contradicted, if the evidence conflicts with other evidence be-
cause a reasonable inference in support of the verdict can be drawn from
the other evidence in support of the verdict, any more than it is permitted
to ignore any other evidence that supports the verdict.79
On a more subtle level of analysis, a reviewing court is not permitted to
treat evidence as undisputed if the evidence, by itself or in combination
with other evidence, gives rise to more than one reasonable inference.
Certainly, it is not proper for a reviewing court to draw an adverse infer-
ence from undisputed circumstantial evidence and to conclude that the
adverse inference is undisputed and conclusive because in the court's
view it is the most reasonable one. Nonetheless, this is arguably what
happened in Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Company80
Richey was a malicious prosecution case in which the central issue was
whether the grocery company lacked probable cause to initiate criminal
proceedings against Kelly Richey. The jury found that the company
lacked probable cause to file a criminal prosecution and awarded dam-
ages to the plaintiff. A bare majority of the Texas Supreme Court8 con-
cluded that the grocery company had probable cause as a matter of law
because Richey was observed by the company's employees concealing a
pack of cigarettes, retaining the merchandise in his possession, and pass-
ing through the check-out line without paying for the merchandise. De-
spite the fact that the court defined probable cause as "the existence of
such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor [complainant],
that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prose-
cuted," 82 the court focused on only some of the circumstances, which
were not disputed, and based on these circumstances drew the logical, but
not an inescapable or the only logical or reasonable, inference that the
78. There is some muddled historical support for the view that more reasonable infer-
ences vitiate or supersede less reasonable ones, but even these cases are limited to situa-
tions in which the more reasonable inference "is conclusive, or so clear, positive and
disinterested that it would be unreasonable not to give effect to it as conclusive." South-
land Life Ins. Co. v. Greenwade, 159 S.W.2d 854, 858 (1942); see also Ross v. Green, 139
S.W.2d 565, 572-73 (1940).
79. As former Justice Raul Gonzalez has accurately opined in a dissent in the Cas-
taneda case, although certain "evidence" may not be directly disputed or contradicted, it
may still conflict with other evidence in the record. See Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Cas-
taneda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 205 (Tex. 1998).
80. 952 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1997).
81. The majority includes Justice Spector, who delivered the opinion, Chief Justice
Phillips, and Justices Hecht, Enoch and Owen. See id. at 516.
82. Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 517 (quoting Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 917,921 (Tex. 1983)).
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grocery company did not lack probable cause and concluded that the ma-
licious prosecution claim should not have been submitted to the jury.8 3
Four justices dissented.84 As explained by Justice Cornyn's dissent, based
on the definition of probable cause and record evidence showing that
Richey had paid $51.75 for groceries for his family, re-entered the store
to purchase items for charity, paid an additional $8.89 in cash for those
items, had cash available to pay $1.49 for the cigarettes, and offered to
pay for them when he was reminded about them, the jury could have
concluded that a reasonable person would not have believed that a crime
had been committed. 85
Seasoned appellate lawyers know that appellate judges try to deter-
mine in their own minds what really happened. But this is a preliminary
step in the appellate process, and not a proper basis for deciding cases in
the face of jury findings grounded on probative evidence. Although Jus-
tice Hardberger's explanation concerning the court's motives or ideology
is too harsh,86 it is arguable that the court's rejection of some verdicts has
been based on one or both of these misapplications of the principle that
undisputed evidence cannot be disregarded by the fact finder.87
C. OPINION TESTIMONY
Opinion testimony, and particularly expert opinion testimony, has
played an ever increasing role in modern litigation. Hence, the distinct
body of principles used by courts to assess the admissibility and probative
value of opinion testimony is particularly important to the modern litiga-
tor. Probably for this reason, and because the rules of evidence allow
opinion testimony on the ultimate issues to be resolved by the trier of
facts,88 special rules have been devised for evidentiary review of opinion
testimony.
83. See id. at 518 ("Probable cause in this case, in which the facts and events leading
up to Richey's arrest are undisputed, is therefore a question of law for the court and not the
trier of fact. Because Richey concealed merchandise, retained the merchandise in his pos-
session, and passed through the check-out line without paying for the merchandise, the
only probable-cause issue is the reasonableness of Brookshire's belief as to Richey's state
of mind at the time of the appropriation.") Unless the majority opinion was attempting to
state that in malicious prosecution cases, for public policy reasons, the probable cause
question is a question of law for the court, see Lonon v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 999 S.W. 2d 458,
460 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.), and that the jury is restricted to decid-
ing only what happened on the basis of conflicting evidence rather than the larger issue of
the reasonableness of Brookshire's belief as to Richey's state of mind, the opinion cannot
be reconciled with conventional evidentiary review standards. Even then, the majority's
analysis of the "reasonableness" issue is questionable. Viewed most charitably in this light,
the majority opinion stands for the proposition that if all the objective elements of a crimi-
nal offense have been committed, there is probable cause, regardless of the overall reason-
ableness of the prosecutor's belief.
84. See Richey, 952 S.W.2d at 520. Justice Cornyn penned the dissent and is joined by
Justices Gonzalez (Raul), Baker, and Abbott.
85. See id. at 521.
86. See Hardberger, supra note 13.
87. See, e.g., Provident Am. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 988 S.W.2d 189, 189 (Tex. 1998).
88. See TEX. R. EvIo. 704; Louder v. De Leon, 754 S.W.2d 148, 148-49 (Tex. 1988);
Birchfield v. Texarkana Mem'l Hosp., 747 S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. 1987).
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The general rule is that opinion testimony does not bind the trier of
fact, even if it is not controverted, unless the subject matter is one for
experts alone.89 Because the rule that expert testimony is generally not
conclusive is based on the fact that the testimony is opinion testimony,
and not because of its source, uncontroverted opinion testimony is also
not conclusive when provided by a lay witness. 90 Of course, lay opinion
testiruony may have no probative value whatsoever if the subject requires
expertise, 91 or for other reasons.
In order for expert opinion testimony to have probative value the wit-
ness must be qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, train-
ing, or education to testify on scientific, technical, or other specialized
subjects for the testimony to assist the fact finder in understanding the
evidence or determining a fact issue.92 More significantly from the stand-
point of no-evidence review of jury findings grounded on expert opinion
testimony, in Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc.,93 the Texas Su-
preme Court clearly held that "[a]ll expert testimony must be shown to
be reliable ... regardless of whether the scientific evidence presented is
novel or conventional. ' 94 This means that the expert's opinion testimony
must be based on reliable data,95 a proper methodology or reasoning pro-
cess, 96 and there must not be "too great an analytical gap between the
data and the opinion proferred. '' 97 In other words, if the trial court or the
reviewing court concludes that the bases for the expert's opinions are not
reasonable or logical, the opinion has no probative value. Moreover, it
appears that to pass the reliability threshold, the expert must address and
refute other plausible theories.98 Whether these theories involve causa-
tion ("if there are other plausible causes of the injury or condition that
could be negated, the plaintiff must offer evidence excluding those causes
89. See McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986); see also, Uniroyal
Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 338 (Tex. 1998); Offshore Pipelines, Inc. v.
Schooley, 984 S.W.2d 654, 665 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. filed).
90. See Martinez, 977 S.W.2d at 339.
91. See Hood v. Phillips, 554 S.W.2d 160, 165-66 (Tex. 1977).
92. See TEX. R. EvID. 702; Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152-53 (Tex. 1996) (stat-
ing that expert witness must "possess special knowledge as to the very matter on which he
proposes to give an opinion") (quoting 2 RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 1401, at 32 (Tex. Practice 3d ed. 1980)).
93. 972 S.W.2d 713 (Tex. 1998).
94. Id. at 722-26.
95. See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Crye, 907 S.W.2d 497, 499-500 (Tex. 1995).
96. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 714 (Tex. 1997); see also
Burroughs, 907 S.W.2d at 499-500.
97. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146
(1997).
98. See Havner, 953 S.W.2d 714; see also E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson,
923 S.W.2d 549, 557 (Tex. 1995).
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with reasonable certainty") 99 or some other relevant matter,100 these for-
midable requirements make it possible for a reviewing court to discount
expert opinion testimony needed to sustain a fact finding.
A similar approach has been taken to lay opinion testimony. In the
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Gonzalez'0 1 case, a lay witness testified based on
her observation of the macaroni salad that, because it had footprints and
cart track marks in it, it "seemed like it had been there a while."'' 1° Yet
this otherwise proper shorthand rendition of the facts was discounted be-
cause the witness had not seen the macaroni salad prior to the fall and
had no personal knowledge of the length of time it had been there.
Hence, in the court's view the testimony constituted "mere speculative,
subjective opinion of no evidentiary value."'10 3
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT PRACTICE AND THE
NO-EVIDENCE REVIEW STANDARD
Approximately nine years after the first Advisory Committee to the
Texas Supreme Court decided not to recommend the adoption of a sum-
mary judgment rule, a summary judgment rule modeled on Federal Rule
56 was adopted. 10 4 Although the procedure was heralded as a means to
reduce costs and to improve judicial economy by piercing unmerited
claims and untenable defenses, 0 5 during most of the time that has
elapsed since its adoption, trial and appellate courts have viewed sum-
mary judgment practice with hostility. In 1962, the Texas Supreme Court
expressed the view that summary judgment is harsh, drastic, extreme, and
demands strict application and every indulgence for the nonmovant. 10 6
99. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720. Refutation of the alternative factual theories has not
been required in other contexts. See, e.g., Offshore Pipelines, Inc. v. Schooley, 984 S.W.2d
654, 664 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. filed); Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 559.
Venerable precedent provides that the plaintiff is not required to exclude every other pos-
sible cause of an injury producing event. See, e.g., Burlington-Rock Island R. Co. v. Elli-
son, 167 S.W.2d 723, 726 (1943) ("These plaintiffs were not required to exclude the
probability that the accident might have occurred in some other way. To so hold would
impose upon them the burden of establishing their case beyond a reasonable doubt.") One
case has concluded otherwise in reliance on the Merrell Dow opinion. See Williams v.
NGF, Inc., 994 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.).
100. See Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 720 (Tex. 1997); see also
Weiss v. Mechanical Associated Servs., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 125-26 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
101. 968 S.W.2d 934 (Tex. 1998).
102. Id. at 936.
103. Id. at 937-38.
104. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a (adopted as a new rule, effective March 1, 1950).
105. See Roy W. McDonald, Summary Judgments, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 285, 286 (1952);
Gulbenkian v. Penn, 252 S.W.2d 929, 931 (1952).
106. See Gaines v. Hamman, 358 S.W.2d 557, 561-63 (1962). Somewhat interestingly,
earlier appellate decisions had treated the procedure more favorably after its adoption in
1950. See Rolfe v. Swearingen, 241 S.W.2d 236, 239-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1951, Writ ref'd n.r.e.) (opinion by Pope, J.) (holding that a nonmovant could not raise a
disputed issue of fact by remaining silent and announcing ready for trial). Justice Jack
Pope's opinion contains the following interesting language: "While appellees were shouting
their facts, appellants elected to remain mute." Id. at 239. To hold otherwise, ". . . will
sound the requiem to a rule that has hardly been christened." Id. at 240; see also Fowler v.
[Vol. 531516
2000] JUDGES, JURIES, AND REVIEWING COURTS
Thereafter, in a series of opinions, the high court reversed summary judg-
ments routinely by giving a restrictive interpretation of the basic sum-
mary judgment test'0 7 and by taking a strict view of the sufficiency of the
movant's summary judgment evidence.' 08 Not surprisingly, trial judges
developed a reluctance to grant summary judgments.10 9 Consequently,
Civil Procedure Rule 166a was largely ineffective for the next three de-
cades until the rule was rewritten in 1978. The principal amendments
concerned both the basic test and the sufficiency of the movant's sum-
mary judgment evidence.
By virtue of the 1978 amendments, issues not expressly presented to
the trial court by written motion, answer, or other response may not be
considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.110 In addition, the amend-
ments authorized summary judgment on the basis of the uncontradicted
testimonial evidence of an interested witness or of an expert, if the evi-
dence is probative and could have been readily controverted, but was
not."I By 1979, as reflected in the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority,112 summary judgment
was recognized as a helpful tool, rather than as an invasion of the trial
process or some type of snap judgment.
Until 1997, a defendant-movant was required to conclusively negate
one or more elements of a plaintiff's cause of action or to conclusively
establish each element of an affirmative defense to show an entitlement
to a summary judgment.113 Although a series of United States Supreme
Court decisions 1' 4 had reinterpreted the federal rule to require nonmov-
ant plaintiffs to come forward with evidence showing that a genuine issue
for trial exists to avoid a summary judgment, until 1997 the Texas Su-
preme Court rejected this approach.
Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 237 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ
ref'd) (relying on following general rule from Cochran v. Wool Growers Cent. Storage Co.,
166 S.W.2d 904, 908 (1942): "Where the testimony of an interested witness is not contra-
dicted by any other witness, or attendant circumstances, and the same is clear, direct and
positive, and free from contradiction, inaccuracies, and circumstances tending to cast suspi-
cion thereon, it is taken as true, as a matter of law.").
107. See Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827 '(Tex. 1970).
108. See Texas Nat'l Corp. v. United Sys. Int'l, Inc., 493 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1973).
109. A study revealed that during a six-year period, only 2% of civil cases in Texas were
handled successfully by summary judgment. See Robert L. Pittsford & James W. Russell,
III, Summary Judgment in Texas: A Selective Survey, 14 Hous. L. REV. 854, 854 (1977).
Another study revealed that 70% of the summary judgment cases decided by the Texas
Supreme Court from 1968 to 1976 resulted in reversals. See Patrick K. Sheehan, Summary
Judgment: Let the Movant Beware, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 253, 254 (1976).
110. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
111. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c), (d).
112. 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979).
113. See Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551, 555-56 (Tex. 1989); see also Jennings v. Bur-
gess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1996); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 471 (Tex.
1991).
114. In Celotex, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that "the plain language of [Federal]
Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery
and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
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The Texas Supreme Court amended the summary judgment rule, effec-
tive September 1, 1997, to embrace the modified federal approach to mo-
tions that are based on challenges to a ground of recovery or defense on
which the nonmovant would have the burden of proof at trial. As a result
of the amendment, a defendant may obtain a summary judgment without
conclusively negating an element of the plaintiff's cause of action.
15
The most important aspect of the new provision is the incorporation of
the familiar no-evidence standard, applied in instructed verdict cases, in-
volving objections to submission of vital fact issues and in connection
with motions under Civil Procedure Rule 301 for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict or in disregard of particular jury findings, 1 6 into summary
judgment practice. Regardless of the context, as explained in the preced-
ing sections of this article, Texas courts have followed the approach that,
in applying the no-evidence standard of review, the evidence is to be con-
sidered in its most favorable light in support of the nonmovant's posi-
tion.'1 7 Under this approach to the scope of review, a no-evidence
challenge fails if some probative testimonial or documentary evidence is
identified, regardless of the number of witnesses or quantity of contrary
evidence. This is a particularly good approach in the context of the sum-
mary judgment practice.
The application of a broad, whole record scope of review to summary
judgment practice and the review of summary judgments on appeal
presents a more serious question than the use of such a standard in di-
rected verdict or judgment n.o.v. practice in the context of conventional
trials. In the absence of a conventional trial record, a consideration of the
nonmovant's evidence, through the prism of the movant's contrary evi-
dence, would certainly affect how the nonmovant's evidence is
evaluated." 8
115. Subdivision (i) of amended Civil Procedure Rule 166a provides:
(i) No-Evidence Motion. After adequate time for discovery, a party without
presenting summary judgment evidence may move for summary judgment on
the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements of a
claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof
at trial. The motion must state the elements as to which there is no evidence.
The court must grant the motion unless the respondent produces summary
judgment evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.
TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i).
116. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 301; see also Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insuffi-
cient Evidence" Points of Error, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 361 (1960); William Powers, Jr. & Jack
Ratliff, Another Look at "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence," 69 TEXAS L. REV. 515
(1991). It is abundantly clear, however, that the new Texas no-evidence summary judg-
ment practice is controlled by the same limited scope of review no-evidence standard as
applied to legal insufficiency challenges made in conventional trials. See Weiss v. Mechani-
cal Associated Servs., Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 124 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. de-
nied); Moore v. K Mart Corp., 981 S.W.2d 266, 268-69 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet.
denied).
117. See, e.g., Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. 1992); see also
W. Wendell Hall, Revisiting Standards of Review on Civil Appeals, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1045, 1133 (1993).
118. The federal courts apply the same standard for granting summary judgments as
they apply in deciding to grant a directed verdict. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
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A proper application of the scintilla rule and principles of undisputed
evidence take on an even larger importance in the context of summary
judgment practice because it is easier for trial judges and reviewing courts
to lose sight of how the no-evidence standard would and should be ap-
plied in the litigation process in the absence of a conventional trial. In
summary judgment cases, the so-called "equal-inference" rule can have a
beguiling surface appeal and arguments that the evidence is undisputed
are more difficult to refute when the actual dispute concerns the exis-
tence of conflicting inferences. 119
VIII. THE ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE TEXAS
FACTUAL INSUFFICIENCY STANDARD
In contrast to the no-evidence standard of review, the factual suffi-
ciency standard requires the trial judge to view and weigh all of the evi-
dence supporting the finding and to set aside the finding only if the
supporting evidence is so weak that the finding is manifestly wrong and
unjust. °20 Although it is widely recognized that this standard is imprecise,
it is an obvious safeguard against judgments that are supported by some
evidence, but that should not be permitted to stand, in the interest of
justice. 121 In the Texas procedural system, insufficient evidence rulings
are assigned to trial judges and the courts of appeals, but not to the Texas
Supreme Court.122 Certainly, this system design removed the Texas Su-
preme Court from factual sufficiency review on at least two prudential
grounds. First, the high court should be concerned with significant legal
questions, not with conducting a particularized review of individual cases
to correct errors. Error correction is the principal function of the four-
teen courts of appeals, not the function of the Texas Supreme Court. Sec-
ond, the high court should respect and defer to the lower courts, which
are better suited to deal with fairness issues that may arise in individual
cases when the evidence is too weak to withstand scrutiny, but will with-
stand a proper no-evidence analysis.
U.S. 242, 250 (1986). As explained by the Supreme Court in the Reeves case, this requires
the trial judge and any reviewing court to review all of the evidence in the record, but to
give credence only to the evidence and reasonable inferences that favor the nonmovant.
See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., - U.S ..... 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2110
(2000).
119. See Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995). Both the
majority and the concurrence seem to forget that the fact finder should decide the proxi-
mate causation issue, regardless of whether the issue is couched in terms of an assessment
of whether the conduct or product in question was a "substantial factor" or in terms of the
"foreseeability of harm," if reasonable minds could differ about these matters under the
evidence.
120. See Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986). The courts of appeals may not
reverse merely because the appellate judges conclude that the evidence preponderates to-
ward an affirmative answer. See Herbert v. Herbert, 754 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. 1988).
121. See Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient Evidence" Points of Error,
38 TEXAS L. REV. 361, 368 (1960); see also W. St. John Garwood, The Question of Insuffi-
cient Evidence on Appeal, 30 TEXAS L. REV. 803, 813-14 (1952).
122. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 22.001, 22.225 (West 1988 & Supp. 2000); Pool v.
Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).
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Despite the finality of judgments in the courts of appeals on fact ques-
tions, a number of cases make it plain that the Texas Supreme Court can
review such a determination by a court of appeals to decide if the correct
standard of insufficiency review has been applied by a court of appeals. 1
23
Unfortunately, in recent years, the Texas Supreme Court has developed
an unhealthy skepticism about how the courts of appeals have been doing
factual sufficiency reviews. Commencing with Pool v. Ford Motor Com-
pany,124 to allow the high court to determine if the correct standard of
factual sufficiency review has been applied, courts of appeals were re-
quired to detail the evidence relevant to the issue and clearly state why
the finding is so against the weight of the evidence that the finding is
clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. 12 5 This approach was adopted by
the predecessor court, which no doubt regarded the exercise of the power
of at least some intermediate appellate courts to review verdicts with con-
siderable skepticism.
In the 1990s, this same idea was applied to factual sufficiency review of
punitive damage awards, whether they were reversed or affirmed by a
court of appeals. 126 Of course, strict scrutiny review of orders and judg-
ments affirming punitive damages verdicts has nothing to do with pre-
serving respect for the fact finding process or the fact finder. It arguably
demonstrates instead that the high court has more confidence in its own
ability to decide individual cases than juries, trial judges, and the courts of
appeals. As a practical matter, however, a particularized review of indi-
vidual cases by the court is neither wise nor possible for the court to con-
duct. It is also not within the court's job description. 127
IX. THE LEGACY OF LEON GREEN: A REPLY
TO DEAN POWERS
The central thesis of an important article written by Dean William
Powers of the University of Texas School of Law is that the Texas Su-
preme Court's recent tort jurisprudence has not changed the traditional
Texas standard and scope of no-evidence review. The only change is the
court's substantive assessment of duties owed to injured claimants
through the development of a "particularized duty" approach that shifts
"more of the normative work in tort litigation away from juries and to-
ward judges.' 28 Dean Powers regards this development as a good thing
123. See Pool, 715 S.W.2d, at 634-35 (citing cases).
124. 715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986).
125. See id. at 635.
126. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Ellender, 968 S.W.2d 917, 925 (Tex. 1998); Ellis County
State Bank v. Keever, 888 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex. 1994);.
127. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 22.001 (a)(6) (West 1988).
128. William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEXAS L. REV.
1699, 1719 (1997) ("the Texas Supreme Court is increasingly willing to overturn jury ver-
dicts in tort cases ... by attending more carefully to the question of duty. Specifically, the
court is moving away from broad definitions of duty and toward particularized definitions
of duty. Defining legal duties has always been a proper role for the courts.").
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because, "in some places," such as design defect litigation,129 the jury
should not be given broad policy-making authority. 130 Dean Powers also
suggests that this development has its roots in the philosophy of Dean
Leon Green.' 3 '
I disagree with Dean Powers' assessment that what is happening in
Texas is restricted to an appropriate exercise of the Texas Supreme
Court's law-question jurisdiction. I also believe that Dean Green would
not have approved of what Dean Powers calls the court's increasing ten-
dency to overturn jury verdicts or to otherwise minimize the jury's role in
the tort litigation process.
Dean Leon Green's legal career and his body of written work spans
several decades. 132 Dean Green's work is particularly interesting and im-
portant because he was concerned with the dynamic operation of the per-
sonal injury reparations system, not merely with substantive tort law
concepts. Dean Green's concern with the litigation process differentiates
him from other torts men 133 of his era and thereafter. As its title demon-
strates, Judge and Jury,134 a compendium of law review articles assembled
in book form, Dean Green's most important work and the work that is
most frequently identified with his views, is about the litigation process in
tort law and the respective roles of judges and juries.
Because Dean Green's written work spans nearly fifty years, and his
attitudes were developed and refined during his lengthy academic career,
it is difficult to definitively assess how he would evaluate developments in
129. Id. at 1719 ("It is one thing to let juries determine whether a particular driver was
driving reasonably. That issue is relatively narrow and local. When we ask juries to deter-
mine how an automobile ought to be designed, however, we give juries broad policymaking
authority .... The move to particularized duty rules in some cases, however, shifts at least
some of that normative power back to courts, arguably where it belongs.").
130. The Texas Supreme Court's recent opinion in Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d
251 (Tex. 1999), does not wholeheartedly embrace this view. See id. at 260-61.
131. See William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEXAS L.
REV. 1699, 1701 n.5 (1997) (noting the works of Leon Green); see also id. at 1703 ("Duty is
usually an issue for the court; breach and proximate cause are usually issues for the jury.
The crucial difference is that Green's approach assigns more power to the court... .").
Powers also notes that: "[i]t is important to understand where the shift is taking place-on
the duty issue-and where it is not-on the no evidence standard of review. Dean Green
•.. would have placed more of that power in the hands of the courts-albeit trial courts,
not appellate courts." Id. at 1719.
132. Dean Leon A. Green (1888-1979), A.B. Ouachita College 1908, L.L.B. University
of Texas School of Law 1915; Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School, 1926-1929; Dean
and Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law, 1929-1947; Distinguished
Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law, 1947-1977.
133. See David W. Robertson, The Legal Philosophy of Leon Green, 56 TEXAS L. REV.
393, 393 (1978) ("The eminence of Leon Green as a torts man is a matter of longstanding
and considerable record.").
134. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY (1930). Dean Green's other publications include:
RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 1014 (1928); The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases: II, 29 COLUM. L.
REV. 255 (1929); THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORT CASES (1939); INJURIES TO RELATIONS
(1949); Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482 (1956); Duties, Risks, Causation
Doctrines, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 42 (1962); The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60




the current legal environment. It is unlikely, however, that Dean Green
would have approved of an appellate court's use of a particularized duty
analysis in tort cases as a doctrinal device to shift power from the jury and
the trial judge to the appellate courts. 135
Like Dean W. Page Keeton,136 Dean Green conceptually defines the
term "cause of action" in the conventional common law manner as con-
sisting of four elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages (if they
are a part of the cause of action). 137 Dean Green's approach does involve
an elemental duty analysis to be made by the trial judge, as a law ques-
tion, based on a set of factors 138 that bears some resemblance to the cur-
rent Texas approach to duty questions, 139 with one very significant
exception. Dean Green did not regard foreseeability of harm as a central
part of the trial judge's duty determination.
As early as 1928, Dean Green reasoned that the foreseeability or antic-
ipation of harm standard by which juries determine the negligence issue,
i.e., the violation of duty, should not be used as a formula for the trial
judge's judgment in defining duties.140 Dean Green explains:
[i]nasmuch as the foreseeability of danger is an essential requisite of
the negligence issue, this issue is sometimes confused with the func-
tion of the judge to determine whether the risk of injury suffered by
the victim was within the scope of the defendant's duty. The two
135. Dean Green was highly critical of this phenomenon in several of his writings. See
Leon Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482 (1956); Leon Green, Jury
Trial and Promixate Cause, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 357 (1957).
136. Dean Keeton also considered duty to be an elemental component of cause of ac-
tion analysis, although he shared Dean Prosser's view that the duty issue normally is a
simple one. See W. Page Keeton, Action, Cause of Action, and Theory of the Action in
Texas, 11 TEXAS L. REV. 145, 146-49, 157-58 (1933); see also W. Page Keeton, Negligence,
Duty and Causation in Texas, 16 TEXAS L. REV. 1 (1937); W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROS-
SER AND KEETON ON TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
137. See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014,
1022 (1928) ("In the class of cases known as 'negligence cases' a working analysis has been
rather widely adopted ... [s]uch a case has four elements: (1) the right-duty element; (2)
the negligence element; (3) the damage element; and (4) the causal relation element.").
138. See id. at 1034.
The following are believed to be the factors of most significance in influenc-
ing the determination of duties and through them the limits of the protection
afforded by law. There are doubtless others:
1. The administrative factor.
2. The ethical or moral factor.
3. The economic factor.
4. The prophylactic factor.
5. The justice factor.
139. Id.; El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306, 311 (Tex. 1987) ("Duty is the function
of several interrelated factors, the foremost and dominant consideration being foreseeabil-
ity of the risk."); Otis Eng'g Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. 1983) ("Though the
decisional law of this State has yet to address the precise issues presented by this case,
factors which should be considered in determining whether the law should impose a duty
are the risk, foreseeability, and likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the
actor's conduct, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury and conse-
quences of placing that burden on the employer.").
140. See LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 30-31, 68-74 (1930) (first published as Analy-
sis of Tort Cases, 35 W.VA. L.Q. 323 (1929)); Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence
Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1026-35 (1928).
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issues are distinct; one is based on underlying policies that call for
protection against risks of danger, the other on foreseeability of the
risk of danger in the particular case. 141
Under Dean Green's theory of risks, in resolving the duty question, the
trial judge may take into consideration the economic and moral environ-
ments, the difficulties of administration, former court decisions and stat-
utes, and all other factors brought to the court's attention, to determine
what risks are comprehended by the defendant's duty. 142 Dean Green
recognizes, however, that in most cases the trial judge's duty determina-
tion will follow a familiar pattern143 and that "[i]n most cases the law has
already been determined by former decisions or by statute under which a
doctrine or rule governing defendant's conduct is firmly established. 1 144
In describing the trial judge's role, Dean Green makes it clear that the
trial judge must determine the existence of a "duty and its coverage, that
is, whether it may extend to the particular risk or risks.., suffered by the
victim. 1 45 Dean Green explains that the trial judge's duty determination
in an individual case resembles the decision of the jury in that:
no rule of law can be stated which is automatically valid beyond the
factual data of the case decided; that the lawmaking function of the
court is necessarily founded on policy-the interests of the rest of us
as well as those of the parties-and that this lawmaking function of
determining duties and their scope must always be left free for the
next case. 14
6
In the same vein, Dean Green also explains "[a]side from those few cases
where duties have been stated in terms of conduct, the duty a defendant
was under, or the protection a plaintiff was entitled to have, is unknow-
able until the case has been adjudged. ' 147 Under this view, trial judges
conduct a particularized duty analysis to aid in the resolution of specific
cases in accordance with general principles that have been developed and
declared by appellate courts.
Dean Green also believed that the causation element should be re-
stricted to a cause-in-fact question and should not be expressed in terms
of wrongfulness or responsibility.1 48 Dean Green believed that responsi-
141. Leon Green, The Negligence Action, 369 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 369, 379 (1974); see also
Leon Green, Identification of Issues in Negligence Cases, 26 Sw. L.J. 811, 828 (1972).
142. See Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MIcH. L. REV.
543, 567-68 (1962).
143. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 60 (1930) (first published as The Duty Problem in
Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1025-26 (1928)). "How can a judge say there
was a duty in this case and not in that one? This is the first problem in any case. In the
'mine run' of cases it may not be so very difficult because other more or less similar cases
have blazed trails." Id.
144. Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543,
562-63 (1962).
145. Leon Green, Joseph Walter Bingham, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1009, 1014 (1965).
146. Id.
147. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 60 (1930).
148. See Leon Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 30, 30-35 (1963) ("It will be noted that the use of such terms as proximate, remote,
sole, intervening, superseding and other 'cause' terminology has been studiously avoided
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bility issues should be allocated to the elements of duty and breach, i.e.,
negligence. Thus, Dean Green's definition of proximate cause would be a
very different one from the current Texas definition of proximate cause,
which includes an articulated foreseeability component. 149 In other
words, Dean Green's philosophy to this extent seems to align him with
Judge Cardozo, rather than Judge Andrews, in the celebrated Palsgraf
case.
150
Although Dean Green clearly admired Justice Cardozo, 151 he was not
in agreement with the particularized duty analysis set forth in the Car-
dozo opinion in Palsgraf because Dean Green regarded forseeability of
harm as a part of the negligence element rather than a definitive compo-
nent of the trial judge's duty determination. 152 Dean Green disagreed
with Justice Cardozo's duty formula for two reasons. First, the trial
judge's duty determination depends upon a number of factors, finds its
source in the law, and cannot sensibly be reduced to a formula. 53 Sec-
ond, in Dean Green's view, foreseeability of harm is a question of fact to
be decided by the jury.154
.... There may be and usually are many 'causes' of an injury, but the only inquiry before
the court is whether the defendant's conduct contributed substantially to the injury.").
149. See Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Tex. 1995).
150. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (1928). Justice Cardozo's majority
opinion assumes that foreseeability questions should not be part of "[t]he law of causation
remote or proximate," id. at 101, and states: "[lt]he risk reasonably to be perceived defines
the duty to be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to another or to others within the
range of apprehension." Id. at 100. Although Cardozo's opinion is usually read to mean
that the duty element assigns most of the heavy lifting to the court, the opinion also states:
"[t]he range of reasonable apprehension is at times a question for the court, and at times, if
varying inferences [of negligence] are possible, a question for the jury." Id. at 101. In
contrast, Justice Andrews' opinion is usually cited for the view that these matters are the
province of proximate causation, which is a jury question. See id. at 103-04 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting) ("What we do mean by the word 'proximate' is that, because of convenience, of
public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines to trace a series of
events beyond a certain point. This is not logic. It is practical politics.").
151. See Leon Green, Benjamin Nathan Cardozo, 33 ILL. L. REV. 123 (1938).
152. See Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV.
565-68 (1962).
153. See Leon Green, The Palsgraf Case, 30 COLUM L. REV. 789, 797 (1932) ("The
trouble arises in attempting to use the formula of 'foreseeability' as a sole detriment of
duty .. . Foreseeability is based upon experience; experience is, of course, a factor in
determining the scope of duty, but by no means the sole factor. It frequently happens that
duty coincides with experience, but not always so, and it is a mistake to think that judges
are so narrowly bound, or that they need a formula for their purposes."). Green's interpre-
tation of what he referred to as the "suggested determinants of duty" is contained in Judge
and Jury at 74-96 (1930). See Leon Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28
COLUM. L. REV. 1014, 1031-32 (1928).
154. The following footnote in Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence
Law, 60 Mich. L. Rev. 543, 566 n.72 (1962) discussing H.L.A. HART & A.M. HONORP,
CAUSATION IN THE LAW 103 (1959) ("the authors") describes the analytical problems with
Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf.
The trouble with Palsgraf is that the issue to which Judge Cardozo is talking
is not clearly formulated. Causal relation in the case is clear. Either the
insufficiency of evidence to raise an issue of negligence with respect to the
plaintiff, or the absence of negligence itself with respect to her and the injury
she suffered, seems clear enough to support his judgment. The interpretation
given by the authors, and perhaps Professor Seavey, is that of no duty to her.
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Once the trial judge decides to pass the case to the jury under the
court's instructions, the jury decides the issues of negligence and causa-
tion, both of which are submitted in simple terms "by some formula
which would indicate as unrestrictively as possible upon what phase of
the case the judgment of the jury should be desired. ' 155 Significantly,
"the jury's judgment is restricted to the single case and it has no validity
beyond this."'156
Dean Green preferred the use of a type of broad-form jury submission
of the negligence and causation questions under which the jury draws the
ultimate conclusions of liability or defense.157 Green disliked both the
general charge 158 and the type of granulated special issue submission that
preceded the 1973 amendments to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, 159
because both methods unduly complicate the case before the jury and
permit an invasive form of appellate review.160 Dean Green's particular
dislike of the proximate-cause doctrine rests largely upon his view that it
creates confusion and blurs the functions of court and jury.161
As far as the appellate courts are concerned, Dean Green recognizes
that their primary function is to declare rights and duties by "indicating
the boundaries of legal rules, or the harms against which government will
undertake to give protection, '1 62 but disapproves strongly of the develop-
ment of "many subtle doctrines for effectually controlling jury judgment
That there was a duty to Mrs. Palsgraf as a waiting passenger is clear, but
whether defendant's duty included the risk that befell her is seemingly what
the authors think is involved, and that on this basis Judge Cardozo decided
that the risk was determined on the basis of "foreseeability."
Despite some of the language in his opinion, that interpretation is not consistent with his
opinions in H. R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896 (1928), decided the same
year, Wagner v. International Ry., 133 N.E. 437 (1921), and Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441 (1931), nor in fact, with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111
N.E. 1050 (1916), and Hynes v. New York Cent. R.R., 131 N.E. 898 (1921). In the last
mentioned cases, Judge Cardozo clearly finds the source of duty in the law. In Palsgraf the
important fact is that the highest appellate court, after all the evidentiary data and argu-
ments were in, and after consideration of all the factors involved, simply decided that the
injury suffered by Mrs. Palsgraf was not a risk within the scope of any duty owed her as a
passenger. If this is an acceptable interpretation, many more factors were involved than
mere "foreseeability." On the other hand, if the court decided that there was no sufficient
evidence to raise an issue of negligence, then "foreseeability" was a highly pertinent
consideration.
155. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 30 (1930).
156. Id.
157. See Leon Green, Identification of Issues in Negligence Cases, 26 Sw. L.J. 811, 827-
28 (1972); Leon Green, The Submission of Issues in Negligence Cases, 18 U. MIAMI L. REV.
30, 33-41 (1963); Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28 TEXAS L.
REV. 471, 778-82 (1950).
158. See Leon Green, A New Development in Jury Trial, 13 A.B.A. J. 715, 715 (1927)
("As a scientific method of settling disputes the general verdict rates little higher than the
ordeal, compurgation or trial by battle.").
159. See Leon Green, Special Issues, 14 TEX. B.J. 552, 555-56 (1951).
160. See Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law, 471, 761-64 (1950).
161. See Leon Green, Jury Trial and Proximate Cause, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 357, 358-59
(1957).
162. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 386 (1930).
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and reaching results which the appellate courts themselves approve. ' ' 163
Dean Green believed that the development of particularized rules of law
for future cases to be generally unwise, if not impossible. Accordingly,
trial judges and juries are best suited to resolve specific controversies in
accordance with general principles.' 64 Certainly, Dean Green, who re-
garded appellate review and the expansion of the power of appellate
courts with suspicion and occasional distaste, 165 never intended reviewing
courts to second-guess the trial judge or the fact finder on the particular-
ized application of general principles in the context of an individual
case.
166
Under Dean Green's analysis, tort cases can only be understood
through the procedural process to which they are subjected by the
court. 167 The important lesson to be learned from Dean Green's consid-
erable work product is that the litigation process is a dynamic process in
which the principles of tort law are developed, applied, and refined by
judges and juries.168 Who decides what happened, whether the conduct
of the actors involved violated applicable standards of care, and the insti-
tutional deference accorded those determinations in the litigation process
are the important questions.
163. Id.; see also Leon Green, Identification of Issues in Negligence Cases, 26 Sw. L.J.
811, 811 (1972) ("Appellate courts, however, too frequently misconceive the issue of the
defendant's duty, and seek to affirm or reverse a judgment with a labored opinion based on
false issues supported by questionable doctrinal refinements.").
164. LEON GREEN, JUDGE AND JURY 57-58 (1930). "The most a legal science can do
with the classes of cases here involved is to employ broad formulas both for judge and jury
and rely upon their respective judgment-passing capacity to dispose of cases as they arise."
Id.
165. See David W. Robertson, The Legal Philosophy of Leon Green, 56 TEXAS L. REV.
393 (1978). Professor Robertson cites Dean Green's writings for the following pertinent
propositions:
Probably the strangest chapter in American legal history is how in the short
period of the last fifty or seventy-five years, the same period during which
trial courts were losing most of their power, the appellate courts have drawn
unto themselves practically all the power of the judicial system.
The appellate courts have now secured control of all the essentials of jury
trial .... Unless the judge handling the case is a dullard (and this is so rare
that it need not be taken into account), some device of appellate control is
always at hand to further the ends of justice as they may appear, however
perfect the record may seem on its face. Where impulses are so strong to do
ultimate justice and where the jury and what its members heard, observed,
and considered are so far removed from the chambers of the court, the
brakes of self-restraint are severely taxed. The supreme power in a court
system as in any other hierarchy inevitably increases with its exercise.
Id. (citing Jury Trial and Proximate Cause, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 357, 358 (1957)).
166. See Leon Green, Jury Trial and Mr. Justice Black, 65 YALE L.J. 482, 487-88 (1956)
("Whatever its ultimate explanation, the shift of power from the trial court and jury to the
appellate court-from the local community to a centralized court system-may well
deaden the administration of the law, just as these other concentrations of power have
produced conformity in other facets of our lives."); see also Leon Green, Identification of
Issues in Negligence Cases, 26 Sw. L.J. 811 (1972).
167. See LEON GREEN, JUDGE & JURY 32 (1930).
168. See William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 32 (1953).
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X. THE REDEFINITION OF BASIC CAUSATION PRINCIPLES
As Dean Green was fond of arguing and lamenting, 169 the causation
issue can present a golden opportunity for a reviewing court to substitute
its judgment for the judgment of the jury. Unfortunately, in Union Pump
Company v. Allbritton, 70 the Texas Supreme Court has taken full advan-
tage of this opportunity by modifying both the causation standards used
in tort cases and the analytical process through which the fact finder's
causation finding is reviewed. 171
For a number of years, Texas has used the test of proximate cause in
negligence and other cases, 172 and producing cause in strict tort liability
cases 173 and in actions brought for violation of the Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices Act. 174 Proximate cause consists of three components, which are
included in the proximate cause definition incorporated in Texas jury
charges 75 in the following order: a chain of causation component, a but
for causation element, and a foreseeability component.
The Texas Supreme Court incorporated the element of foreseeability
into the definition of proximate cause during the early 1900s for two im-
portant reasons. By ruling that the basic test of proximate cause in negli-
gence cases is whether the defendant could have reasonably foreseen that
as a consequence of the defendant's negligence the injury or some similar
injury would probably result,176 and thereby adding an express foresee-
169. See Green, supra notes 160-61 and accompanying text.
170. 898 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1995).
171. Although Justice Owen delivered the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Phillips
and Justices Gonzalez, Hightower, Hecht, Gammage, and Enoch joined in the court's ma-
jority opinion. Justice Cornyn concurred in the result. Only Justice Spector dissented from
both the majority's analysis and result.
172. See Missouri Pac. R.R. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1977)
(applying to common law negligence); see also Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.,
690 S.W.2d 546, 549 (Tex. 1985) (negligence per se); Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995
S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1999) (implied warranty).
173. See C. A. Hoover & Son v. O.M. Franklin Serum Co., 444 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex.
1969) (holding that foreseeability is normally part of the causation standard in strict prod-
uct liability cases); see also General Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. 1993)
(strict tort liability).
174. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (West 2000); see also Haynes & Boone
v. Bowser Bouldin, Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 179, 182 (Tex. 1995).
175. The standard definition of proximate cause used in the Texas Pattern Jury Charge
for a number of years provides:
"Proximate cause" means that cause which, in a natural and continuous se-
quence, produces an event, and without which cause such event would not
have occurred. In order to be a proximate cause, the act or omission com-
plained of must be such that a person using ordinary care would have fore-
seen that the event, or some similar event, might reasonably result
therefrom. There may be more than one proximate cause of an event.
See STATE BOARD OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES: GENERAL NEGLIGENCE,
INTENTIONAL PERSONAL TORTS PJC 2.4 (1998). This definition is based largely on Rudes
v. Gottschalk, 324 S.W.2d 201, 207 (Tex. 1959).
176. See Seale v. Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 65 Tex. 274 (1886 ); Texas & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Bigham, 38 S.W. 162 (1896); Gulf, Colo. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 219 S.W.1
97, 198-99 (Tex. 1920); see also Carey v. Pure Distrib. Corp., 124 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex.




ability component to the chain of causation and but for causation compo-
nents, the form of negligence submission to the jury was designed:
to avoid as far as possible the metaphysical and philosophical nice-
ties in the age-old discussion of causation, and to lay down a rule of
general application which will, as nearly as may be done by a general
rule, apply a practical test, the test of common experience, to human
conduct when determining legal rights and legal liability.177
Because foreseeability then had no place under the principles of strict
products liability embraced by the Texas Supreme Court in the 1960s,178
Texas courts developed a different causation standard called "producing
cause."' 179 Proximate and producing cause differ in one significant re-
spect: the foreseeability component of proximate cause is not a part of
the definition of producing cause. 180 Otherwise, the technical differences
in the wording of the two causation standards are of no legal signifi-
cance. ' 81 Accordingly, the definition of producing cause and the first part
of the definition of proximate cause define what Texas courts describe as
the Texas version of cause-in-fact. 182
In Union Pump, however, another element was added to the formula.
Based on earlier cases that used the term substantial factor as part of the
analytical process, first as a synonym for the but for element,183 and sec-
177. City of Dallas v. Maxwell, 248 S.W. 667, 670 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1923, holding
approved); see also Rudes v. Gottschalk, 324 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Tex. 1959).
178. See McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc. 416 S.W.2d 787, 788-89 (Tex. 1967) (adopting
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A as law of Texas). This is no longer true. The Texas
Supreme Court has adopted the modern view embodied in the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability § 2(b) (1998), which makes "[f]oreseeability of risk of harm ... a
requirement for liability for a defectively designed product." Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2
S.W.3d 251, 257 (Tex. 1999).
179. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 801 (Tex. 1975). The conventional definition of
producing cause is as follows: "an efficient, exciting, or contributing cause that, in a natu-
ral sequence, produces the [occurrence] [injury] [occurrence or injury]. There may be more
than one producing cause." STATE BAR OF TEXAS PATTERN JURY CHARGES: MALPRAC-
TICE, PREMISES, PRODUCTS PJC 70.1 (1998).
180. See Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661, 667 (Tex. 1999); General
Motors Corp. v. Saenz, 873 S.W.2d 353, 357 (Tex. 1993). Another aspect of the elimination
of foreseeability from the causation standard in strict tort liability cases concerns the appli-
cability of "new and independent cause" to the causation standard in strict tort liability
cases. See V. Mueller & Co. v. Corley, 570 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding "new and independent cause" is not applicable to
strict liability); cf. Dover Corp. v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1979, writ ref'd. n.r.e.) (holding new and independent cause applies).
181. In fact, some versions of the producing cause definition have contained an express
but for causation component. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344,
351 (Tex. 1977), overruled by Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979);
see also Jones v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 169 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1943).
182. The Texas Supreme Court has explained that "[c]ause in fact is ordinarily defined
as 'that cause which, in a natural and continuous sequence, produces an event, and without
which cause such event would not have occurred."' Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Lieck,
881 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex. 1994) (quoting 1 STATE BAR OF TEXAS, TEXAS PATTERN JURY
CHARGES PJC 2.04 (1987)). Despite the inclusion of a "natural and continuous sequence"
chain of causation component, foreseeability is not considered a part of the cause in fact
definition. See id.
183. See Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McCleery, 418 S.W.2d 494, 497 (Tex. 1967); see also
Missouri Pac. R.R. v. American Statesman, 552 S.W.2d 99, 103 (Tex. 1977).
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ond, as a way of describing proximate or legal cause,184 the Union Pump
majority radically changed causation analysis by adding a vague substan-
tial factor/responsibility component to the cause in fact component of
general causation analysis. 185 After noting Justice Andrew's dissenting
opinion in the Palsgraf case, 186 and discussing the court's earlier opinion
in Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez,187 the majority quotes and embraces the
following comment from section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts:
In order to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that
the harm would not have occurred had the actor not been negligent
... . The negligence must also be a substantial factor in bringing
about the plaintiff's harm. The word "substantial" is used to denote
the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing
the harm as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that
word in the popular sense, in which there always lurks the idea of
responsibility, rather than in the so-called "philosophic sense," which
includes every one of the great number of events without which any
happening would not have occurred. 188
By embracing the Restatement comment, the court's opinion both
raised the causation standard applicable in negligence and strict liability
cases and rendered the causation standard considerably less intelligible.
Prior to Union Pump and Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, cause in fact analysis
under Texas law was an objectively factual one designed to be performed
by juries in a step-by-step process without reference to any separate no-
tions of responsibility. First, the chain of causation component asked the
jury to decide whether the harm suffered by the plaintiff could be traced
back to the defendant's conduct or to a defective product sold by the
184. See Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Perez, 819 S.W.2d 470, 472 (Tex. 1991). As Professor
David Robertson clearly explains in The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEXAS L.
REV. 1765, 1776 (1997), this phenomenon is partially attributable to the Second Restate-
ment of Torts use of the term "substantial factor" as a synonym for the but for test (RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1) (1965)), as an alternative in combined force
(two fires) cases (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432 (1)-(2) (1965)) and as part of
legal or proximate cause analysis (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 433 (1965)).
As Professor Robertson explains, the use of "substantial factor" as a synonym for but-for
causation and its use as a part of an approach to legal cause "should both be discouraged."
David Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 1765, 1777
(1997).
185. Justice John Cornyn's concurring opinion accurately describes the evolution of
"substantial factor" analysis. See Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 777-84
(Tex. 1995).
186. Palsgraf v. Long Island Ry. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101-05 (1928).
187. 819 S.W.2d 470 (Tex. 1991) (per Gammage, J.)
188. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965). Although the causation
provisions of the Second Restatement are an enigmatic hodgepodge, section 433 does pro-
vide considerably more guidance about the contours of substantial factor analysis than
comment (a) to section 431. Section 433's black letter provides for a consideration of the
following factors: the number of other factors which contribute to the harm; "whether the
actor's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous and active
operation up until the time of the harm;" and the lapse of time. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 433 (1965); see also id. § 435(2) ("The actor's conduct may be held not to be a
legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking back from the harm to
the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should
have brought about the harm.").
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defendant. Second, the but for component required the jury to determine
whether the harm would have occurred even if the defendant had been
acting properly or if the product had not been defective. 189 Furthermore,
because the method of reasoning to be applied has objective characteris-
tics, juries can perform these functions sensibly and their determinations
can be subjected to a principled process of evidentiary review. In other
words, the inclusion of a substantial factor/responsibility element to the
causation standard does not help juries perform their function because it
is vague and opaque, although it does unfortunately enable a reviewing
court to discount a jury's causation finding on the basis of the court's
conclusion that the connection between the wrong and the harm is some-
how too attenuated or remote to hold the defendant responsible.
The majority's analysis in Union Pump makes the matter plain. The
case involved injury to an employee who claimed that a pump manufac-
tured by Union Pump was the proximate or producing cause of her inju-
ries. The pump had malfunctioned and caused a fire. The employee
assisted in abating the fire but, after the fire was extinguished, a nitrogen
purge valve appeared to present an emergency. The employee and her
supervisor climbed over a pipe rack to reach the valve since it was the
shortest route. Upon reaching the valve, the employee and her supervi-
sor were told that it was not necessary to block off the valve. Both the
supervisor and the plaintiff returned by the same route, even though this
was unsafe because the pipe rack was wet and the employees were still
wearing firefighting gear, when the plaintiff hopped or slipped off the
rack. 190
The trial court granted summary judgment for Union Pump. The court
of appeals reversed because material issues of fact existed concerning
producing cause and proximate cause.191 The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed the court of appeals. The majority's reasoning process substitutes
a new causation standard that applies with "equal force to proximate and
producing cause"1 92 and allows a reviewing court to reject a causation
finding on the basis of the court's decision that the defendant should not
be held responsible. 193 Although the addition of Union Pump's substan-
189. The mental process is a bit more complicated because it consists of several steps.
As explained by one commentator, the five steps are: (i) identify the injuries in suit; (ii)
identify the wrongful conduct; (iii) mentally correct the wrongful conduct to the extent
necessary to make it lawful, leaving everything else the same; (iv) ask whether the injuries
would still have occurred had the defendant been acting correctly in that sense; and (v)
answer the question. See David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75
TEXAs L. REV. 1765, 1770-71 (1997).
190. See Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 774 (Tex. 1995).
191. See Allbritton v. Union Pump Co., 888 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1994), rev'd, Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. 1995).
192. Union Pump Co. v. Allbritton, 898 S.W.2d 773, 776 (Tex. 1995).
193. The majority sums up its cryptic reasoning in one paragraph:
Even if the pump fire were in some sense a "philosophic" or "but for" cause
of Allbritton's injuries, the forces generated by the fire had come to rest
when she fell off the pipe rack. The fire had been extinguished and Allbrit-
ton was walking away from the scene... [T]he pump fire did no more than
create the condition that made Allbritton's injuries possible. We conclude
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tial factor component has a more obvious effect on producing cause,
which otherwise has no separate responsibility component, the addition
of a recondite, subjective responsibility component to the proximate cau-
sation issue has the same effect because it can be used to pretermit the
pertinence of the foreseeability component. A reviewing court can con-
clude that the causal connection is too weak if the court does not want
the defendant to be held responsible, even if the harm was reasonably
foreseeable. Ironically, the effective substitution of an undefined sub-
stantial factor component for the foreseeability component of the Texas
proximate cause standard actually returns the subject of causation to "the
metaphysical and philosophical niceties in the age-old discussion of cau-
sation.' '194 As a result, the arcane quality of the new approach makes it
much easier for a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for the jury's
decision, and much more difficult for anyone else to demonstrate why the
reviewing court has exceeded the scope of its judicial power.
XI. THE DUTY DEBATE IN THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
The Texas Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence has also been con-
cerned with the issues of duty, breach of duty, and the role of foreseeabil-
ity in the adjudicative process.195 In Mellon Mortgage Company v.
Holder, a case against the owner of a parking garage, which involved a
sexual assault on a woman who was told by a police officer to drive into
the parking garage where the officer assaulted her in his squad car, a
plurality of the Texas Supreme Court consisting of Justice Abbott, who
delivered the plurality opinion, Justice Hecht and Justice Owen joined
two other justices who wrote concurring opinions in rendering a take
nothing judgment.
Based on reasoning that it was not foreseeable to the garage owner
that the claimant would be accosted several blocks from the garage where
she would be sexually assaulted, the plurality opinion holds that the ga-
rage owner owed no duty to the claimant. This holding is grounded on a
particularized foreseeability analysis of the type applied by Justice Car-
dozo in the Palsgraf case based on the apparent belief that section 281 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts embraces "the gist of Chief Judge Car-
dozo's duty analysis.' 96 A concurring opinion by Justice Baker rightly
criticizes the plurality opinion by asserting that it changes the duty analy-
that the circumstances surrounding her injuries are too remotely connected
with Union Pump's conduct or pump to constitute a legal cause of her
injuries.
Id.
194. See supra note 177. Now that foreseeability of harm must be proven by claimants
in products liability cases, with the largely theoretical exception of manufacturing defect
cases, a much better way to resolve the court's real concern in Union Pump, that the pro-
ducing cause standard is too strict because it reaches too far, would be to add a foreseeabil-
ity component, that is, to use the traditional "proximate cause" standard instead. See supra
note 193.
195. See Mellon Mortgage Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. 1999).
196. Id. at 656.
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sis to include the traditional proximate cause foreseeability test used by
Texas courts, and thus allocates too much power to judges, including ap-
pellate judges, but then curiously comes to essentially the same conclu-
sion that the garage owner owed no duty to the plaintiff because the
garage owner could not have foreseen that a sexual assault would occur
in the garage. 197 The three dissenting justices, Justice Harriet O'Neill,
who delivered the dissenting opinion, Justice Hankinson, and Chief Jus-
tice Phillips disagree with the plurality opinion and with Justice Baker's
conclusion that the plaintiff or the crime, or both, were not foreseeable.
Because the dissenting justices share Justice Baker's view that the plural-
ity's so-called Palsgraf two-prong duty analysis does not reflect Texas law
and represents a poor policy choice concerning the proper role of judge
and jury,198 it appears that the assignment of a particularized duty analy-
sis to trial judges and reviewing courts has not been embraced by the
Texas Supreme Court.1 99
There are important differences between Justice Baker's concurring
opinion and the dissenting opinion of Justice O'Neill, Chief Justice Phil-
lips, and Justice Hankinson. Justice Baker's concurrence rests upon his
belief that a proper foreseeability analysis grounded on the
Timberwalk 200 factors of frequency, recency, publicity, and similarity of
previous criminal activity requires the conclusion that it was not foresee-
able to the garage owner that a sexual assault would occur in the ga-
rage,201 even when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant plaintiff, Ms. Holder.20 2 Justice Baker's concurrence con-
cludes, in essence, that the heightened proof requirements of the particu-
larized Timberwalk standard were not satisfied by the summary
judgment evidence presented on Ms. Holder's behalf because there was
no evidence of personal crimes occurring in the garage. In contrast, the
dissenting justices concluded that "it was not unforeseeable as a matter of
law that a rape might occur in the parking garage" 20 3 based on summary
judgment evidence that crimes involving personal violence had occurred
in the vicinity of the parking garage, although not in the facility itself.
Justice Baker and the dissenters do not view the Timberwalk factors as
exclusive; however, Justice Baker's concurrence clearly reflects his view
that the Timberwalk duty standard requires more than evidence of vio-
lent crimes in the vicinity of the garage, as distinguished from evidence of
197. See id. at 662-63 (Baker, J. concurring).
198. See id. at 665 (O'Neill, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Phillips and Justice
Hankinson).
199. Justice Gonzales did not participate in the decision. In addition, Justice Enoch's
concurring opinion states that he "can join neither the plurality opinion nor Justice Baker's
writing ..... Id. at 660.
200. Timberwalk Apartments, Partners, Inc. v. Cain, 972 S.W.2d 749, 759 (Tex. 1998).
201. See Mellon, 5 S.W.3d at 662 (Baker J., concurring).
202. As explained in the next section of this paper, the Texas Supreme Court has devel-
oped particularized duty standards in a number of specialized contexts.
203. Mellon, 5 S.W.3d at 669 (Justice O'Neill, Chief Justice Phillips, and Justice Hankin-
son, dissenting).
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personal crimes on the landowner's property itself. Justice Baker's appli-
cation of the duty analysis articulated previously by the Texas Supreme
Court for use in a particular and arguably special class of cases involving
the liability of one person for the alleged foreseeable criminal conduct of
another is more palatable than the even more particularized Palsgraf ap-
proach embraced by Justice Abbott's plurality opinion. 20 4 But Justice
Baker's conclusion about the insufficiency of the evidence to support sub-
mission of the case to the jury is highly questionable. Even though it is
not an easy task to decide whether Justice Baker or Justices O'Neill, Phil-
lips, and Hankinson have reached the right conclusion concerning the
summary judgment evidence under the Timberwalk standard, the dis-
sent's view is considerably more persuasive.
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Abbott, seems puzzled by
the concerns expressed in Justice Baker's concurrence and by the dissent-
ers. In paraphrased form, the plurality opinion asks why-the same partic-
ularized foreseeability analysis used by juries in deciding whether the
defendant's negligence constituted a proximate cause of the occurrence is
not used by judges and reviewing courts in deciding the threshold duty
issue. The simple answer to this fundamental question is that it is nor-
mally not the function of the trial court in negligence cases tried to juries
to decide whether the defendant's conduct lacks reasonable care or
whether it is the legal cause of the occurrence: it is the jury's job to per-
form these roles in the litigation process.
A failure to keep this fundamental principle in mind will allow trial
judges and reviewing courts to substitute judicial assessments about
whether the pertinent standard of care was violated for the assessment of
juries, and to disregard jury findings on so-called legal grounds regardless
of the sufficiency of the evidence or the principles used to evaluate the
verdict under the evidence. In other words, the principles of evidentiary
review that are designed to constrain judges from usurping the role of the
fact finder will become largely irrelevant in the decision-making process
if the trial or reviewing courts can bypass the fact finder by conducting a
detailed foreseeability assessment of the risk of harm and concluding that
no duty exists under the particular facts of the case being decided. 20 5
204. The key differences are that, first, Justice Abbott's plurality opinion strongly sug-
gests that a particularized duty analysis should be conducted in every case rather than in
unusual or special cases for which a particularized duty standard has been developed on
prudential grounds. Second, the particularized duty analysis grounded on the Timberwalk
factors of frequency, recency, publicity, and similarity of previous criminal activity is con-
siderably less case specific and more serviceable as a principle of general application in the
special class of cases to which it is applicable than the specialized foreseeability assessment
contained in Justice Cardozo's opinion in Palsgraf.
205. In Palsgraf Revisited, Dean Prosser speculates about how far Helen Palsgraf was
from the conductor when the package fell. Under Cardozo's particularized assessment of
the evidence this appears to be the key fact question, or at least one of them. Another one
might be whether the conductor was aware of her presence, wherever she was. The point is
that a refined foreseeability assessment, particularly one conducted by a reviewing court, is
likely to ignore, reject, or misperceive the picture presented to the fact finder because the
focus of the reviewing court is on the cases' outcome, rather than on the evidence and its
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XII. PALSGRAF AND THE SECOND RESTATEMENT
Because the avoidance of harm is a central concern of tort law, foresee-
ability of harm is an extremely important factor in negligence law. The
negligence standard of care is based on an assessment of foreseeability of
some harm. Foreseeability constitutes a component of the duty, breach,
and causation elements of a negligence cause of action because the pro-
cess of developing and refining or applying standards of care and deciding
whether they have been violated in specific cases involves the foreseeabil-
ity of harm. But how particularized the trial judge's foreseeability assess-
ment should be in deciding whether to submit the case to the jury, or in
the submission process itself, is the important question. Despite Justice
Abbott's mistaken view that Justice Cardozo's particularized duty analy-
sis in Palsgraf has been widely accepted,206 by far the most common view
of modern scholars, as reflected in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is
that the particularized application should be conducted by the fact finder,
not by the trial judge.20 7 As explained by Professor George C. Christie
and his co-authors, although section 281 of the original Restatement of
Torts did embrace Cardozo's analytical framework by providing that
"[t]he actor is liable for an invasion of an interest of another if: (a) the
interest is protected against unintentional invasion, and (b) the conduct
of the actor is negligent with respect to such interest or any other similar
interest of the other which is protected against unintentional invasion," 20 8
the Restatement (Second) of Torts alters this position. Although the Sec-
ond Restatement uses a stylized version of the Palsgraf case as an illustra-
tion to section 281, it does not indicate whether the defendant's
nonliability rests on a no-duty rule or on some other flaw in the elemental
relationship to the jury's verdict. See William L. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 32 (1953).
206. See Mellon, 5 S.W.3d at 655-56.
207. See DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 186 (2d ed.
1998); see also RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). Professor Gary Schwartz
in his Reporter's note to section 6 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles
explains the Second Restatement in the following manner:
The Restatement Second of Torts tended to regard duty as a nonissue, except
for problems of affirmative duty. Its definition, in § 281, of "The Elements of
a Cause of Action for Negligence" does not include any explicit duty ele-
ment. In the Scope Note to Topic 4, the Restatement Second indicates there
is a duty owed by the actor to the other not to be negligent. Yet the Scope
Note goes on to solve the duty problem by affirming that "normally, when
there is an affirmative act [by the defendant], there is a duty not to be negli-
gent." The Scope Note then refers to the special issue of mere failures to act.
To be sure, § 281(b) identifies, as one "element" of a "cause of action," the
requirement that "the conduct of the actor is negligent with respect to the
[plaintiff]." Whether this requirement of a "foreseeable plaintiff" is an as-
pect of the doctrine of duty, or instead of the doctrine of proximate cause, is
a point that the comment to § 281(b) does not make clear. Modern scholars
tend to classify the issue of the foreseeable plaintiff under the general head-
ing of proximate causation.
See, e.g., DAVID W. ROBERTSON ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 186 (2d ed.
1998).
208. See GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS,
278-79 (3d ed. 1997).
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analysis. More significantly, the Second Restatement includes specific
sections on the respective roles of judges and juries209 and assigns the jury
the function of determining "what the general standard of conduct would
require in the particular case, and so to set a particular standard of its
own within the general one."' 210 Similarly, the Second Restatement also
provides that "it is the function of the jury to determine, in any case in
which it may reasonably differ on the issue . . . whether the defendant's
conduct has been a substantial factor in causing the harm to the
plaintiff."21
The view that the particularized application of the general standard
should be conducted by the fact finder, not by the trial judge, is held so
strongly that it is conventional for torts scholars to assert that the duty
element is easily resolved since all persons have a general obligation to
exercise ordinary care to avoid the infliction of harm on others. Al-
though the duty element is technically separate from the key questions of
negligence and causation, which, of course, are normally jury questions,
in most cases, duty is a non-issue.212 Under this approach, in the garden-
variety negligence case, the jury is meant to conduct the particularized
foreseeability analysis. Of course, under Texas negligence law, this par-
ticularized analysis involves both the issues of negligence and causa-
tion.213 The jury's determination of liability and damage issues is, of
course, subject to review at both the trial and appellate level for factual
and legal sufficiency of the evidence in accordance with standards of re-
view that credit and respect the jury's role in the litigation process.
XIII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEANINGFUL
SUBSTANTIVE STANDARDS
As Dean Powers accurately points out,2 14 the Texas Supreme Court has
been very active in considering the policy question of what duties one
member of society owes to another. The court has devised no-duty rules
that preclude the imposition of liability on prudential grounds215 and has
refined the concept of duty in particular types of cases. 216 Importantly,
209. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 328B, 328C (1965).
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328C cmt. b (1965). The Third Restatement
Discussion Draft largely agrees with and draws on the Second Restatement. See RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 5(b) (1999) ("When, in light of all the
facts relating to the actor's conduct, reasonable minds can differ as to whether the conduct
lacks reasonable care, it is the function of the jury to make that determination.").
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 434(2).
212. See Clark v. Waggoner, 452 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Tex. 1970).
213. See supra Part X.
214. "What is really happening is that the court is reinvigorating the concept of duty,
and the court is doing this for intellectually sound reasons. Recognizing that fact has im-
portant ramifications for Texas lawyers." William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas
Supreme Court, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 1699, 1704 (1997).
215. See Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex. 1997) (holding "there is no
cause of action for breach of an implied warranty of accounting services").
216. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Tex. 1995) (holding "the law of
products liability does not require a manufacturer or distributor to warn of obvious risks").
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however, the court has also recognized and affirmed the existence of du-
ties and developed meaningful substantive standards. 217 I agree that this
is a traditional function of the court in recognizing, developing, and defin-
ing common law standards of care and conduct. Indeed, aside from the
difficulty of predicting how particularized standards will work in subse-
quent cases due to the vagaries of human conduct, there is nothing to
stop the Texas Supreme Court from making policy based judgments
about rights and duties owed by one member of society to another. The
court does its best and most important work when it conscientiously as-
sesses what Texas law should require of manufacturers of commercial
products 218 and consumer goods, 219 as well as accountants 220 and law-
yers,221 among others. The court does this important work very well
when it develops meaningful substantive standards that can be used by
trial judges and juries to decide specific cases, subject to review under
appropriate standards of review. The development of particularized
rules, however, that narrow or eliminate the general duties of care ex-
In Caterpillar, a products liability case against a manufacturer and a retailer alleging negli-
gence and strict liability, the court extrapolates this principle from a prior finding that
there is no duty to warn when then a products' risks are matters "'within the ordinary
knowledge common to the community."' Id. (quoting Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v.
McGuire, 814 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tex. 1991)). Determining "the proper inquiry is whether
an average person would recognize that operating an industrial vehicle with open sides and
top presents a degree of risk or serious harm to the operator," the court ruled that the
defendants "did not have the duty to warn of the dangers of operating the loader as an
open cab without a ROPS [rollover protective structure]." Caterpillar 911 S.W.2d at 383-
84 (holding "Texas law does not require a manufacturer to destroy the utility of his product
in order to make it safe").
217. See Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977 S.W.2d 328, 336 (Tex. 1998)
(stating that liability for design defect may attach even if the defect is apparent); see also
Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 55-56, 61-63 (Tex. 1997) (finding insurance
bad faith liability based on common law principles recognized and affirmed).
218. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Shears, 911 S.W.2d 379, 383-84 (Tex. 1995) (holding "Texas
law does not require a manufacturer to destroy the utility of his product in order to make it
safe"). Dean Powers correctly views the Caterpillar decision as an example of the court
announcing "a particularized duty rule-that a manufacturer has no duty to design a multi-
purpose machine in a way that makes it impossible to use in one of its intended settings."
William Powers, Jr., Judge and Jury in the Texas Supreme Court, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 1699,
1706 (1997).
219. See Hernandez v. Tokai Corp., 2 S.W.3d 251, 260 (Tex. 1999) (holding "a manufac-
turer's intention that its product be used only by adults does not insulate it from liability
for harm caused by a child who gains access to the product, but liability standards must be
applied in the context of the intended users."). In Hernandez, the court was asked to
decide whether a manufacturer may be found liable for a defective-design products liability
claim if a minor child is injured through the misuse of the manufacturer's lighter by an-
other minor child if the product was intended to be used by adults only, but the misuse by
minors was clearly foreseeable and a safer alternative design was available.
220. See Murphy v. Campbell, 964 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. 1997); see also Arthur Andersen &
Co. v. Perry Equip. Corp., 945 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1997).
221. See Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 238 (Tex. 1999) ("To limit forfeiture of com-
pensation to instances in which the principal sustains actual damages would conflict with
both justifications for the rule ... the central purpose of the equitable remedy of forfeiture
is to protect relationships of trust by discouraging agents' disloyalty."); see also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 49 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996)
(stating "[a] lawyer engaging in clear and serious violation of duty to a client may be re-
quired to forfeit some or all of the lawyer's compensation for the matter").
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isting under well-recognized common law principles may be an unwise
undertaking, unless there is some principled reason for doing S0.222 Cer-
tainly, the adoption of a particularized foreseeability analysis of the type
used by Justice Cardozo in the Palsgraf case would be exactly the wrong
approach. To borrow a phrase from Dean Green, in the "mine run of
cases" the general negligence standards of ordinary care and proximate
causation have not only withstood the test of time and changing circum-
stances, they have provided sufficient guidance to juries in the determina-
tion of individual controversies.223
XIV. CONCLUSION
The division of labor between judges and juries is an important one.
Who decides what happened, whether the conduct of the actors involved
violated applicable standards of care, and the institutional deference ac-
corded those determinations in the litigation process are critical ques-
tions. Many debates have raged about the proper approach and what a
wrong choice means to the administration of justice and the right to trial
by jury. A reasonable assessment of Texas jurisprudence is that Texas
law, and particularly Texas negligence law, has permitted and required
juries to set the particularized standard of conduct, as well as to decide
what happened. Even during the ascendency of Texas special issue prac-
tice, juries decided the ultimate questions of negligence and causation,
pursuant to the trial court's instructions, while reviewing courts were re-
quired by the standards and scope of review to credit verdicts based on
probative evidence. This is the right approach to the litigation process,
and the Texas Supreme Court should not abandon it either forthrightly,
by reinterpretation or by accidental modification of the traditional stan-
dards of evidentiary review.
222. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GENERAL PRINCIPLES § 5 cmt. c (Discus-
sion Draft 1999).
223. See supra note 143.
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